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This thesis consists of three essays that examine the causal effects that income shocks have on firm
and household dynamics.
In the first chapter, I examine the role that income shocks have on the financial performance
of small firms in Ecuador. To this purpose, I use the menor cuantia process, a government
procurement mechanism that randomly selects winning bidders for public tenders. I use the
exogenous variation created by the menor cuantia process to estimate the causal effects of income
shocks on firm growth. I find that the effect on various measures of firm growth is significant,
albeit temporary. The main contribution of this chapter to the literature is that it shows that
the nature and duration of demand shocks, not just their magnitude, are an essential factor in
explaining firm growth.
In the second chapter, I examine the role that income shocks have on household expenditures
on human capital and non-durable consumption using the menor cuantia process as identification
strategy. Overall, I find that household expenditure is highly sensible to temporary income shocks.
Additionally, I find that, for shocks of higher monetary values, the effects are also observed the year
after the shock. This chapter contributes to the literature by focusing on an unexpected, positive,
and temporary income shock. Equally important, I provide estimates of the joint effects on human
capital and non-durable consumption, areas which have traditionally been studied separately.
In the third chapter, co-authored with Nicolas Contreras, we examine the role that income
shocks have on four key areas of education: school attendance, educational expenditures, child
labor, and competency level in mathematics. We study this in the context of Uganda. Our
empirical strategy relies on the exogenous variation in income created by deviations in localized
rainfall. To interpret the results, we propose a simple theoretical framework which allows us to
decompose income shocks into two opposing forces: an income effect and a substitution effect. We
posit that the interaction of these two effects can lead to heterogeneous results for different types
of households. We find that a higher household income increases the odds of children attending
school, increases schooling expenditures, decreases the odds of child labor, and increases the odds
for children to reach a higher level of proficiency in mathematics. When we break down the
average estimates across household types, we find that income shocks have almost no effect on
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school attendance and child labor for those households that rely on farming as their main source
of income. The main contribution of this chapter is that it shows that, even within an ostensible
homogeneous country, income shocks can have heterogeneous effects.
In the first two chapters, I use data from the menor cuantia process. Although not explic-
itly mentioned in the text, a significant amount of technical work was required to assemble this
new dataset. The data from menor cuantia was publicly available but not easily accessible, and
repeated requests for it went unanswered. Consequently, it was necessary to create an algorithm
that searched individually over 40,000 public records. This process, which took over 13 months,
required the use of artificial intelligence, optical recognition techniques, and manual data entry.
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Chapter 1
Letting Luck Decide: Government Procurement
and the Growth of Small Firms
Abstract
I estimate the causal effects of demand shocks, stemming from government procurement,
on the growth of small firms in Ecuador. I assemble a unique dataset using several new
administrative sources and, as identification strategy, exploit a governmental procurement
process that allocates public contracts through a randomized contest.
I find a positive and significant effect of demand shocks on firm growth. On average,
an increase in demand of 10% will increase wage expenses by 4% and fixed assets by 5%
during the year of the shock. I also find no evidence of spill-over effects from demand shocks
on sales to the public or private sector. Finally, as in other studies, I show that demand
positively impacts firm growth but, contrary to other findings, this effect is temporary and
only observed during the year of the shock.
Keywords: Demand Shocks, firm growth, public procurement
J.E.L. Codes: H54, H57 D22
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Small firms contribute up to 45% of total employment and 33% of GDP in developing countries
(Kushnir et al., 2010). Despite this, the majority of small firms never grow beyond a few employees
(Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). The importance of firm growth for economic and political reasons
is evidenced by the number of public policies that have been created to promote it.
Economic theory provides two different approaches to explain firm growth. On one hand, firms
can grow due to intrinsic factors such as: managerial ability (Lucas, 1978), increases in produc-
tivity (Jovanovic, 1982), and experience (Hopenhayn, 1992).1 Public policies meant to address
intrinsic factors include: access to credit, management development programs, and financial lit-
eracy programs. On the other hand, a set of recent papers suggest that demand factors, such as
networking and reputation effects, might be equally important in explaining firm growth (Fishman
and Rob, 2003; Syverson, 2004). In such cases, public policies that restrict competition and favor
small enterprises might have a positive and significant impact on the development of small and
medium enterprises (hereafter SMEs). Argentina’s Ley 25.551 (2001) stipulates that goods pro-
vided by small firms receive a price margin of 7%; in Brazil, government purchases that are below a
minimum threshold are exclusively destined to small firms (Lei Complementar N.123, 2006). The
restriction of government procurement processes to certain, by assumption less competitive, firms
implies that such programs have an opportunity cost. Are these demand-driven programs effective
in promoting the growth of SMEs?
To empirically evaluate the effects of demand, the researcher needs to isolate it from other
factors. This is a complicated prospect because the relation between demand and growth is unclear.
On one hand, a firm may experience growth due to a shift of the demand curve induced by, for
example, changes in preferences or exogenous price increases of substitute products. On the other
hand, a firm that grows may benefit from an increase in market exposure and economies of scale,
leading to an increase in demand. To overcome such identification problems, previous studies have
relied on firm-level price data that allows to decompose demand from productivity shocks (Foster
et al., 2008). When such detailed information is not available, researchers impose a structure on
the demand and production functions and obtain estimates of unobserved demand shocks through
the regression residuals (Pozzi and Schivardi, 2016). Hebous and Zimmermann (2016) exploit
the timing of public government contracts and estimate that a one dollar increase in government
purchases increases the capital investment of U.S. firms by 7 to 11 cents. Ferraz et al. (2016),
whose work is the closest to the present one, use a quasi-experimental design based on the bidding
process in Brazil. The authors find that winning a contract increases firm growth by 2.2% during
the quarter of the shock.
In this study, I examine the short- and long-term impacts that demand shocks, stemming from
1 Queiro´ (2016) presents evidence that the education of managers has a significant effect on firm size while
Cabral and Mata (2003) find that experience is an important factor in determining firm size.
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government purchases, have on the financial performance of SMEs. For this purpose, I exploit the
menor cuantia process, a feature in Ecuador’s public procurement law that awards contracts using
a lottery. Using this process as a source of variation in firm demand, I assemble a unique dataset
that combines firm-level financial information with public records for 1,179 firms that participated
in the process for the years 2010-2012. I then compare the changes in balance sheet indicators
between the winners and the losers of the contests, at the extensive and intensive margin.
I find that demand shocks significantly affect firms’ short-term growth during the year of the
shock. Firms that won a contract report, on average, 22% higher revenues and current assets, and
7% higher fixed assets than firms that did not win. The intensive margin analysis suggests that
increasing demand by 10% will increase wage expenses by 4% and fixed assets by 5%. The effects
of demand shocks are temporary and are only observed during the year of the shock. A year after
winning a contract, gross revenues and current assets revert back to pre-shock levels and there are
no differences in wage expenses and fixed assets between winners and runners-up of the contests.
Moreover, I find that, outside the menor cuantia process, there are virtually no differences in sales
to the government or the private sector between these two groups.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the role of demand on firm growth and
to the nascent literature that examines the role of government procurement on firm dynamics
(Hoekman and Sanfilippo, 2018; Czarnitzki et al., 2018). The main contribution of this paper is
that it highlights that the magnitude, nature, and duration of the shock are important factors to
consider when analyzing how demand affects firm growth. Shocks that are perceived as temporary
or unsustainable seem to only affect short-term measures of growth. Additionally, it provides an
evaluation of a governmental preferential purchasing program for the particular case of SMEs.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows: section 1.2 explains the country context and
procurement mechanism. Section 1.3 introduces the data. Section 1.4 discusses the identification
strategy and empirical methodology. Section 1.5 provides the results and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Public procurement in Ecuador
Ecuador is a small middle-income country with a 2016 population of 16 million people and a
per capita income of $6,205. Since the year 2000, the official currency of Ecuador is the U.S.
Dollar. Prior to the 2006 election, the country experienced political instability, a financial crisis,
and ubiquitous cases of corruption. After the 2006 election, the new government vowed to restore
public trust. As part of this plan, it enacted a new constitution, transparency laws and, in
2008, the Public Procurement Law (LONSCP, 2008). The Law reformed the procedures for the
purchase of public goods and introduced provisions to safeguard the participation of SMEs in
public procurement. The National Public Purchases Agency defines SMEs as a firm that has less
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than 100 employees and has sales lower than 2 million dollars (SERCOP, 2015).
The reform required that all government institutions procure all purchases through an online
portal called Compraspublicas.2 Before Compraspublicas, government procurement was done at
a local level, with limited oversight and accountability. The Law stipulated that the process for
the procurement of public works under a threshold, precisely 0.0007% of the government’s budget,
had to be done under the menor cuantia (“small amount”) process.3 This process contains two
distinct features that are particularly relevant to this study: it is accessible only to SMEs and it
grants contracts through a randomized lottery.
The menor cuantia process functions through Compraspublicas. The portal connects insti-
tutions who procure for services and products (hence projects) with firms, that bid for them. In
order for a firm to bid on a project, it must first register in the portal. During this process, firms
submit their personal and company information including: contact information, professional de-
grees and certificates, tax identification number, personal and company tax returns, inventory of
physical capital, and industrial classification of the company. Once registered, firms are able to
browse through the public contracts available and place their bids.
From the institution’s side, the first step to procure a new public work is to create an entry
in Compraspublicas.4 The new project has to include: a description of the public work, location,
budget, timeline, and project-specific requirements. These requirements include: technical and
professional experience, qualification of employees, previous experience of the firm, education of
managers, technical abilities, machinery, and financial capital.
After this step, the project enters into its first phase, acceptance of bids from firms. There are
two ways used to notify firms of a new project. First, the system sends automatic notifications to
providers. It does so through an algorithm that compares the requirements listed in the project
with the competencies listed in the profile of providers. In addition to contacting providers directly,
the system also posts the project on the database of the portal. During this stage, all registered
providers are able to search and browse through the available projects and express their interest.5
In the second phase of the process, all providers that bid on the project must provide proof
that they fulfill the requirements specified. They do this by uploading official documentation to
Compraspublicas. For instance, if the project requires specific machinery, then providers must
upload the registration and proof of purchase of the equipment. A notable feature of this part of
the process is that the requirements for each public work are objective and, in some cases, the
system does not allow the provider to complete this phase if they do not meet the minimum cutoffs.
2The website address is www.compraspublicas.gob.ec
3For the years 2009-2012, the threshold to use the process was around $150,000.
4Each project must be approved in the government budgetary process. This process is done during the previous
fiscal year.
5In the year 2012, additional rules were added to the system that prevented certain providers from submitting
bids. These rules were not in place during the time period used in this study.
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Following this phase, a committee from the public institution evaluates all the providers that
presented a bid. The committee’s responsibility is to identify if each firm meets the minimum
requirements for the project- effectively supplementing the verification process done by the system.
To illustrate, suppose that a new construction project requires a minimum of 2 years of previous
experience. An interior design firm could, theoretically, qualify for this process. In this case, it is
the role of the committee to verify if the experience listed by the firm is relevant. The committee
does not rank nor provide a numerical qualification of providers; it only determines if they are
qualified to perform the project. The providers that qualify enter into a list. In the final phase of
the process, the system automatically and randomly selects one provider from the list of qualified
providers. This provider is the winner of the contest and is given the contract for the project.
The identification strategy in this study relies on the fact that the allocation of the contract
is random. For a given public contract, all providers that qualify to participate in the lottery
have, on average, comparable characteristics. The impartiality of the procurement process is
ultimately an empirical question, and is addressed in the empirical section, where it is concluded
that menor cuantia projects are, indeed, randomly assigned. Moreover, and regardless of any
empirical considerations, there are two major features of the process that suggest that contracts
are assigned randomly.
First, no negotiation between institutions and firms takes place at any stage of the process.
The price for a given public work is predetermined and, as a result, no preference is given for
one bid being more competitive than another. This is evidenced by comparing the budgeted and
actual costs for a given project. In the menor cuantia process these values always coincide. In
public work projects of higher amounts, which are allocated using different procedures, one can
observe considerable variations between the estimated and actual costs. Second, the requirements
that are set for each contract are defined in terms of objective criteria and must be verified by
legal documents.6
1.3 Data
The data for this study consist of a panel of 1,179 firms that presented bids on a total of 5,475
public works performed under the menor cuantia process during the period between May 2009
and December 2012. Firm-level data were obtained from the National Bureau of Companies of
Ecuador (SUPERCIAS) and include: contact information, yearly tax returns, and balance sheet
6 A potential concern is the committee’s discretion to qualify providers. A committee might try to provide
preferential treatment to a firm by being stringent in their review of other firms and thus limiting the number of
qualified providers. To overcome this potential limitation, I exclude from the sample a firm if, during any contest,
it was the only one qualified into the pool.
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information.7 Data of public works performed under the menor cuantia process come from the
Ecuadorian Procurement Agency (SERCOP) and include: contract information for each public
work, the unique identification number of each firm that bid on each project, a list of qualified
providers, and the winner of the contest.8 At the time of this writing, all data for this project were
publicly available but were not easily accessible. For this reason, the data were obtained by using
a web scraping algorithm. The appendix provides a comprehensive overview of the data gathering
process.
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of firms
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Avg. age (years) 5.41 5.68 4.97 4.69 5.14
Avg. number of qualifications 2.16 6.76 5.68 4.67 5.41
Avg. number of winnings 0.52 0.88 0.82 0.77 0.80
Avg. gross yearly revenue (USD) 255,137 291,232 291,162 233,392 269,230
Avg. total assets (USD) 113,570 133,844 129,358 126,885 128,589
Avg. liabilities (USD) 90,084 105,213 100,211 91,743 98,202
Avg. wage expense (USD) 24,146 22,351 25,508 29,778 25,931
1 Descriptive statistics of 1,179 registered firms participating in the menor cuantia process
for the years in the sample. Values are arithmetic averages. Income, assets, liabilities,
and wage expense are presented in U.S. dollars. Assets (liabilities) include fixed and
current assets (liabilities). The source of the data are the balance sheet reports presented
by firms to the tax authority.
The breakdown of qualified firms by year is as follows: 146 in 2009, 543 in 2010, 543 in 2011,
and 546 in 2012. Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample. The sample
of companies in this study consists principally of small and medium sized firms in the construction
industry. Based on their official registration record, 86% of firms report that their primary special-
ization is construction of buildings, real estate activities, architecture and engineering consulting,
or civil engineering. The companies were categorized based on their size by SERCOP.9 Medium
7All values are obtained from firms’ balance sheet documents, as reported to the tax authority (Servicio de
Rentas Internas).
8Firm level data can be found at http://www.supercias.gob.ec. Public works data can be found at
https://www.compraspublicas.gob.ec.
9A micro firm has between 1 and 9 employees and gross sales and assets of less than $100,000. A small firm
has between 10 and 49 employees and sales and assets between $100,000 and 1 million dollars. A medium firm has
between 50 and 99 employees and sales between 1 and 2 million dollars.
12
sized companies make up 8% of the sample and have average gross revenues of $943,107. Small
sized companies make up 44% and have average gross revenues of $244,590. Micro sized companies
make 48% of the sample and have gross revenues of $84,458. Firms in the sample are young, the
average age (years since registration) is 5.1 years. 90% of firms in the sample are less than 13 years
old. For the period 2009-2012, each firm qualified to be part in the random drawing an average
of 5.41 times per year, winning a contract, on average, 0.80 times per year. Financially, firms
report to have average total assets of $128,589 and average liabilities of $98,202. The average wage
expenditure is $25,931 and 90% of firms report less than $60,000 in wage expenditures.10 Geo-
graphically, 55% of the firms in the sample are located in the 10 most populous cities in Ecuador,
where approximately 50% of the total population live.
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of public works by year: 2009-2012
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Avg. contract amount (USD) 39,794 46,960 53,468 54,600 50,160
Avg. duration of contract (days) 57 63 69 65 65
Avg. days to submit a bid 8 7 7 7 7
Avg. number of qualified providers per contest 12 19 19 14 17
N. of contracts awarded 468 2034 1626 1347 5475
1 Descriptive statistics of the 5,475 public works used in this study by year of procurement. Values are
arithmetic averages of variables. Contract amount is measured in U.S. dollars. Length of contract is
measured in days.
Table 1.2 provides the description of the 5,475 public works used in the study. The average
contract amount is $50,160 and approximately 70% of contracts are below $60,000. Figure 1.1
shows the distribution of the values of public works for the years 2009-2012. The average contract
duration (length of time required for a provider to complete the project) is 65 days and 90%
of contracts last less than 96 days. The average contract has 6 requirements. On average, 17
providers qualified for the public contest per contract. The data obtained from the procurement
agency suggests that all but 16 of the 5,475 public works were completed and delivered.11
10The information on the number of employees in a company is not available. However, a back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that 90% of firms have less than 7 permanent employees.
11The remaining 16 public works were terminated unilaterally. There is no information that describes the reasons
for the termination.
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Figure 1.1: Contract amount of public works under menor cuantia process: 2009-2012
The figure above provides the contract amount of the 5,475 public works in the sample performed in the menor
cuantia process for the years 2009-2012. The values for public works are presented in U.S. dollars.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
The purpose of this study is to estimate the causal effects of demand shocks on firm growth. To
capture different areas of growth, I use four different measures: gross revenues, wage expenses and
fixed and current assets.12
Assume that the relationship between firm growth and demand can be represented by the
following reduced-form model:
y˙it = β0 + β1dit +Xitβ2 + µi + it (1)
where y˙it denotes the growth of firm i during period t, dit is the demand faced by the firm
during year t, Xit is a matrix of firm-specific covariates, µi denotes unobserved time-invariant
firm characteristics, and it is the error term. I define y˙it to be the difference in logs: y˙it =
ln(yit) − ln(yit−1)∀ y ∈ { gross revenues, wage, and fixed and current assets}. Estimating
this model by ordinary least squares will yield biased results if the demand faced by the firm is
correlated with unobserved firm characteristics, µi, which is likely the case.
12 For revenues I use total sales; for wages I use the total expenditure on salaries, wages, and commissions; for
fixed and current assets I use the definition as stated in the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
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To eliminate µi, one could transform the model by first differencing it. Even though this
transformation eliminates µi, estimating the differenced model by OLS will provide a biased es-
timate if changes in demand are correlated with time-variant unobserved firm characteristics, i.e
E[∆it,∆dit] 6= 0. To overcome this identification problem, one needs to identify an exogenous
source of demand.
The increase in demand caused by winning a menor cuantia contest provides the source of ex-
ogenous variation needed to obtain unbiased estimates. Conditionally on qualifying, the random
nature of the lottery ensures that the contract allocation is independent of firm specific charac-
teristics. Firms that did not win the contract serve as an appropriate control group to obtain the
effects of demand shocks on growth.
There are two main concerns with using the contracts allocated under menor cuantia as an
exogenous source of demand. The first concern is that the lottery may not be random. This
would occur if companies or the public institutions were able to manipulate the system. The
second concern is participation. Firms can submit bids for multiple projects on a given year. To
participate in a lottery, each firm must qualify to enter into the pool. If more productive firms
qualify to more contests, then the probability of winning under the process increases. In this case,
even if contracts are allocated randomly, they are not exogenous to firm-level characteristics.13
The randomness of the contest can be tested empirically. The probability of winning a contest
at time t should be orthogonal to any firm-level characteristics observed at time t − 1. Table 1.3
shows the results of a difference in means for the firms that qualified for the public contests during
the years 2010-2012. There are no significant differences between winners and runners-up at the
10% significance level. Additional exercises (presented in the appendix) compare the theoretical
and actual distributions of winners and runners-up over time.14
In addition to this evidence, the lottery is done through Compraspublicas. This portal is
constantly audited by external reviewers and neither firms nor institutions have administrative
access to the site. Finally, the sample in this study excludes a firm, if during any contest, they
won because there was only 1 qualified provider in the lottery. All this evidence supports the
claim that the assignment of contracts is in fact random. For this reason, I estimate the following
reduced form model:
y˙it = β0 + β1dit +Xitβ2 + it (2)
I proceed in two steps. First, I estimate equation 2 on the extensive margin, by comparing
winners of the contests with those that did not win. In this specification y˙it is the measure of growth
for company i at time t, dit equals 1 if the firm won a contract during year t and 0 otherwise,
13In all estimations, I control for the total number of qualifications and winnings by providers.
14The probability of winning a contest is inversely proportional to the number of providers that qualified to the
contest.
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and Xit represents firm-specific controls. I include as controls the age and location of the firm, a
vector of controls that account for geographic characteristics, and regional GDP indicators. All
specifications control for time and region fixed effects.
In the second step, I estimate the effect of demand shocks on the intensive margin. To measure
the intensive margin, I estimate equation 2 defining dit to be the log of sales from menor cuantia.
The coefficient β1 shows how percent changes in exogenous demand affect different measures of
firm growth. To estimate if demand shocks have an effect beyond the year of the shock, I look at
growth at different time intervals, y˙it+i∀ i ∈ {1, 2}.
What does y˙it measure? During the year of the shock, y˙it shows the difference in growth
between winners and losers, with t− 1 being the year of reference. A priori, one would expect
to see significant differences in measures of growth between winners and losers. This is because
winning an additional contract directly impacts balance sheet indicators such as sales and current
asset during the year that the shock occurs. Nonetheless, it is still plausible to observe no differences
between participants of the contest during the year of shock. For instance, if firms were capacity
constrained, i.e. could only perform a limited number of contracts on a given year, then firms
that win contracts from menor cuantia will not be able to perform additional work. Analogously,
firms that did not win the contest, could seek work in the private sector. Under this scenario,
firms replace private contracts with public ones, causing no overall changes in the total amount of
work performed. It is worth noting, however, that the fact that firms apply to the menor cuantia
contest suggests that they are not capacity constraint.15
15An additional explanation would be if firms could easily manipulate the balance sheet information, for instance
to avoid taxation, then this would account for the lack of changes observed.
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Table 1.3: Differences in means, by year
Variable Runners-up Winner P-value
2010
Log total assets (USD) 10.00 10.16 0.43
Log total liabilities (USD) 10.03 10.38 0.12
Log current assets (USD) 9.39 9.73 0.11
Log fixed assets (USD) 9.43 9.71 0.20
Log current liabilities (USD) 9.64 10.05 0.13
Log fixed liabilities (USD) 10.38 10.35 0.92
Log revenue (USD) 11.66 11.70 0.82
Log wage expenditure (USD) 9.19 9.49 0.14
Firm age (years) 5.57 5.82 0.60
2011
Log total assets (USD) 10.17 9.76 0.12
Log total liabilities (USD) 10.25 9.93 0.14
Log current assets (USD) 9.69 9.38 0.14
Log fixed assets (USD) 9.55 9.44 0.59
Log current liabilities (USD) 9.98 9.66 0.12
Log fixed liabilities (USD) 10.23 10.02 0.54
Log revenue (USD) 11.46 11.42 0.85
Log wage expenditure (USD) 9.24 9.00 0.13
Firm age (years) 5.22 4.70 0.25
2012
Log total assets (USD) 9.57 9.61 0.83
Log total liabilities (USD) 9.97 9.81 0.46
Log current assets (USD) 9.15 9.22 0.72
Log fixed assets (USD) 9.67 9.45 0.29
Log current liabilities (USD) 9.72 9.46 0.24
Log fixed liabilities (USD) 9.64 9.92 0.42
Log revenue (USD) 11.13 11.23 0.70
Log wage expenditure (USD) 9.37 9.29 0.59
Firm age (years) 4.86 4.51 0.43
1 The following table presents the results from a Student t-test difference in
means exercise for the firms participating in the menor cuantia contest.
The term “Winners” refer to the firms that won in the menor cuantia
process whereas the term “Runners-up” denotes the firms that did not
win. The values refer to the first lags of the variables.
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1.5 Results
I begin this section by presenting the effects of demand shocks on growth, at the extensive margin
during the year of the shock, shown in Table 1.4. I estimate equation 2 by least squares, the
independent variable winner takes the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise.
Each specification controls for time and region fixed effects and clusters errors at the firm-level.
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is revenue growth. Firms that experienced a demand
shock report, on average, approximately 22% higher revenues than firms that did not experience a
shock. The coefficient of .202 is significant at the 1% level and is robust to the addition of controls.
Columns 3 and 4 present the results for growth of wage expense. The estimated coefficients suggest
that firms that win a contract spend, on average, 5% more on wages than non winners. These
results, however, are not robust to the inclusion of additional controls. Columns 4 and 5 report the
results on growth of fixed assets. Firms that win a contract report, on average, 7% higher fixed-
assets than non-winners. Columns 7 and 8 report the results on current assets. The coefficients
are significant at the 1% level and similar in magnitude to the coefficients estimated for growth of
revenues.
Table 1.4: Effects of demand shocks on firm growth: extensive margin
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Winner 0.245∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.048∗ 0.043 0.081∗∗ 0.068∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.064) (0.029) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.068) (0.071)
Age of Firm -0.016 0.004 -0.001 -0.076∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013)
Contests participated 0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size of firm No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1778 1771 1778 1771 1778 1771 1778 1771
R2 0.014 0.023 0.025 0.044 0.005 0.013 0.029 0.050
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables
are: growth (log differences) of: revenue (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5
and 6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm
won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-level. Age of a
firm is reported in years. Contest participated refers to the numbers of contests that a firm qualified for during a
given year. The size of a firm are a set of dummies that control for the size (as defined by the National Bureau of
Companies of Ecuador) of the firm. The regional controls include: local GDP and construction permits issued during
the year. P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
Overall the results from Table 1.4 suggest that demand shocks affect firm growth in two distinct
manners. For immediate measures of growth, such as revenues or current assets, there is a direct
relationship between demand shocks and growth. To illustrate, given that the average yearly
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revenue of a firm for the sample is $269,230, the estimated coefficient on revenue suggests that
winning a contest increases the measure by approximately $ 59,000 which is close to the average
value of a menor cuantia contract ($50,160). At the same time, the results show that for other
measures of growth, such as wages and fixed assets, this relationship, while positive, has a lower a
magnitude and statistical significance.
Next, I examine the effects of demand shocks on growth at the intensive margin. I estimate
equation 2 by least squares, where the independent variable is the log of total yearly revenue
received from menor cuantia. Table 1.5 presents the estimation results.
Columns 1 and 2 show the results for revenue growth, suggesting that an increase of 10%
in sales will increase declared revenue by 10%. While ostensibly trivial, this result provides a
good indication that the financial statements used in this study are a reliable source to measure
the financial performance of firms. Columns 3 and 4 present the results for the growth of wage
expense. The estimated coefficient of 0.05 is significant at the 1% level and does not change with
the addition of controls. This suggests that an increase of 10% in the demand will increase wage
expenses by 5%. Columns 5 and 6 present the results on growth of fixed assets, the coefficients
suggest that an increase of 10% in the demand will increase wage expenses by 5%. Columns 7
and 8 report the results of current assets and suggest that an increase of 10% in the demand will
increase current assets by 22%. Overall, the results from the intensive margin analysis are similar
in magnitude and significance to the ones presented in Table 1.4.
Table 1.5: Effect of demand shocks on firm growth: intensive margin
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Revenue from menor cuantia 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Age of firm -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contests participated 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size of firm No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,380 1,380 1,380 1,380 1,380 1,380 1,380 1,380
R2 0.017 0.025 0.029 0.058 0.006 0.012 0.050 0.060
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables are
the growth (log differences) of revenue (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and
6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable revenue from menor cuantia is the log of revenues obtained from
the menor cuantia contest. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-level. Age of a firm is reported in
years. Contest participated refers to the numbers of contests that a firm qualified for during the year. The size of a firm
are a set of dummies that control for the size (as defined by the bureau of companies of Ecuador) of the firm. The regional
controls include: local GDP and construction permits issued during the year. P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
Next, I examine the duration of the effects. This is of particular relevance given that the changes
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observed could be due to short-term reasons such as hiring more labor to fulfill the contract or
renting machinery required for a project. Figure 1.2 shows the differences in growth rates between
firms that won a menor cuantia contract and those that did not. The differences are shown for
the first two years after the contest. The figure shows the coefficient for growth estimated using
equation 2 with the 95% confidence interval. The dependent variable is the growth rate in gross
revenues, wage expense, and fixed and current assets. The figure reveals two significant insights.
First, the year after the shock, winners of the menor cuantia contest experience a decrease in gross
revenues and current assets. The decrease the year after the shock is similar in magnitude than
the increase experienced the year of the shock. No effect is observed the year after the shock for
labor costs and fixed assets. Second, no statistically significant effects in any measure of growth
are observed two years after the shock.
Figure 1.2: Firm Growth after winning a contract
The figure above contains the average growth rates t+ k, k ∈ (1, 2) years after winning a contract under the menor
cuantia process. Growth is defined as log differences. The bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The figure
was created using the results from estimating equation 2 by least squares. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise.
One non-pecuniary benefit of winning a contract is that it gives firms experience, reputation,
and contacts in the public sector. In this case, it is possible for winning firms to increase their sales
to the government outside of the menor cuantia process. Table 1.6 provides the results of testing
the difference in means of the sales to the government between the winners and runners-up. There
are virtually no differences in sales to the government after the year of the shock.
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Table 1.6: Average differences in government sales
Sales-Winners Sales-Runners-Up Difference P-Value Year
Year of shock
43,659 120,620 -76,960 0.008343 2009
140,253 268,325 -128,071 0.064538 2010
121,272 203,820 -82,547 0.013566 2011
153,569 250,319 -96,749 0.12826 2012
1 Year after schock
188,835 230,421 -41,586 0.686347 2009
192,870 226,931 -34,061 0.516806 2010
352,894 407,545 -54,651 0.657602 2011
191,365 270,290 -78,925 0.196067 2012
2 Years after schock
187,444 238,895 -51,451 0.466527 2009
432,706 493,418 -60,711 0.708223 2010
233,369 328,853 -95,484 0.174268 2011
1 The following table presents the results from a Student t-test differ-
ence in means. The term “Sales-Winners” and “Sales-Runner-Ups”
refer to all government sales outside of the menor cuantia process for
firms that won and lost in the menor cuantia process, respectively.
The column “Difference” denotes the differences in sales between
winners and runners-up.
I perform several robustness checks, presented in the appendix, to examine the sensitivity of the
results. First, I estimate the results looking at each year individually. Second, I use an alternative
definitions of growth. Third, I estimate the results defining the dependent variable in levels instead
of growth. Fourth, I do a two stage estimation using the sales from menor cuantia as instrument
for total yearly sales. The results are not affected by the use of these alternative specifications.
1.6 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper I estimate the causal effects of demand shocks on firm growth using as a source of
exogenous variation the shocks from the menor cuantia process. I find that, in the short-term,
demand shocks significantly affect firm growth. Firms that win the contest report higher revenues
and assets and spend more on wages and short-term assets than those that did not. The short-term
results are consistent with recent findings in Hebous and Zimmermann (2016) and Ferraz et al.
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(2016). Contrary to their findings, however, there is no evidence of an increase in growth in the
years following the shock. Similarly, no differences in additional sales to the government or the
private sector are observed.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that government procurement has limited long-
term impact on the growth of small firms. There are, however, important caveats concerning the
generalization of these results. The short and aleatory nature of the menor cuantia process may
affect how firms perceived the shock. Firms may be hesitant to invest in long-term assets or hire
permanent workers if the change in demand is perceived as unsustainable or temporary. Similarly,
the small amount and short duration of the projects might imply that firms can accommodate the
increase in demand by hiring temporary staff. Further studies are needed to understand how the
nature, magnitude, and duration of the demand shocks impact the long-term growth of SMEs.
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A Robustness
I perform several robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of the results. In Table 1.7, I
estimate the results looking at each year individually. In column Table 1.8, I estimate growth
using an alternative definition of growth , yt−yt−1
.5∗(yt+yt−1) as discussed in Ferraz et al. (2016). In Table
1.9, I estimate the results defining the dependent variable in levels instead of growth. Finally, I
do a two stage estimation using the sales from menor cuantia as instrument for total yearly sales
(available upon request).
Table 1.7: Regression results by year
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Results for 2010
Winner 0.640∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.101 0.103 0.354∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.373∗∗ 0.349∗∗
(0.186) (0.189) (0.111) (0.112) (0.137) (0.145) (0.165) (0.164)
Age of firm -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Results for 2011
Winner 0.490∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.242∗∗ -0.024 -0.005 0.306∗ 0.292∗
(0.199) (0.202) (0.123) (0.121) (0.135) (0.133) (0.161) (0.162)
Age of firm -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Results for 2012
Winner 0.363 0.249 -0.123 -0.100 0.185 0.208 0.382∗∗ 0.353∗∗
(0.263) (0.257) (0.106) (0.104) (0.150) (0.163) (0.168) (0.171)
Age of firm -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth, by year. The dependent variables
are: the growth (log differences) of: revenues (columns 1 and 2), wage expenses (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and
6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest
at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-level. Age of a firm is reported in years.
P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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Table 1.8: Regression results, alternative growth definition
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Winner 0.249∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.079 0.154∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.071) (0.061) (0.059) (0.065) (0.065) (0.055) (0.055)
Age of firm -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1039 1039 899 899 870 870 1262 1262
R2 0.012 0.064 0.003 0.058 0.033 0.041 0.016 0.047
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables are the
growth, defined as ( yt−yt−1.5∗(yt+yt−1) ) of: revenues (columns 1 and 2), wage expenses (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and
6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest
at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-level. Age of a firm is reported in years.
P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
Table 1.9: Regression results, levels
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Winner 1.443∗∗∗ 1.337∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 0.315 0.272 0.573∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.228) (0.216) (0.200) (0.239) (0.221) (0.171) (0.153)
Age of firm 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1778 1771 1778 1771 1778 1771 1778 1771
R2 0.020 0.149 0.011 0.146 0.001 0.185 0.006 0.196
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables is are the
log dollar amount (as reported in the balance sheet) of revenues (columns 1 and 2), wage expenses (columns 3 and 4), fixed
assets (columns 5 and 6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-level. Age of a firm
is reported in years. P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
B Random Assignment Tests
In this section, I perform several empirical tests to check the menor cuantia assignment mechanism.
I start by constructing a theoretical distribution of the number of times that participants are
expected to win a contest and compare this, using a χ2 test, with the realized distribution. It
is important to note that the process involves both firms and individuals. As a result, I use all
participants for this exercise. The construction of the theoretical distribution is based on the
fact that the probability of winning a contest is inversely proportional to the number of qualified
providers.
For any contest j held at time t, let dkjt = i, i ∈ {1, 0} be an indicator variable taking the value
1 if the provider k wins the contest and 0 otherwise. For each individual contest j, the probability




It follows that the expected value of the number of contracts, Dit = 1, won by a provider can be
represented by:
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Ek[Di = 1] =
J∑
j
P (dj = 1)
where Ek[Di = 1] depends on two factors: the total number of contests J that a given provider
participated in and the number of qualified providers participating in each contest. It is therefore
possible to derive a theoretical distribution of the number of expected winnings by provider, and
test the theoretical results with the observed data. Let Xi be firm specific covariates, then:
Proposition 1- The probability of winning a contest at time t is orthogonal to firm-level characteristics
Xi observed at time t− 1.
Proposition 2- The theoretical and actual frequency distributions of provider winnings are not different.
Note also that the process implies that events should be independent of time. As a result, it
is expected that winning a contest during t − 1 should not affect the probability of winning the
contest at time t.
Ek[Dit|Dit−1] = Ek[Dit] =
Jt∑
jt
P (dj = 1)
Proposition 3- Winning a contest during year t does not affect the probability of winning a contest
during year k ∀t, k ∈ (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) where t 6= k.
Proposition 1 is tested and presented in the text. Proposition 2 and 3 are tested by using the
χ2 test using the actual and theoretical distributions. I use all of the contest won by all providers
during the 2009-2012. I pooled the providers that won more than 12 times. This was done as the
number of expected providers in each of those categories was less than five. Proposition 3 is tested
using a similar mechanism as in proposition 2 but only include those providers that qualified for a
given contest in two given years. Results are presented in the following tables. I fail to reject the
null hypothesis on all three cases at the 10% level.
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Table 1.10: Realized vs. expected frequency distributions















Pearson χ2 Pr= .242
1 The following table presents the results of a χ2 difference in distribution test between
the theoretical and actual number of times providers in the menor cuantia process were
expected to win contracts.
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Table 1.11: Expected vs. Actual distribution















Pearson χ2 Pr= .132
1 The following table presents the results of a χ2 difference in distribution test between
the theoretical and actual number of times providers in the menor cuantia process were
expected to win contracts. The test looks at individuals that qualified for a random
contest during the years 2009 and 2010, 2010 and 2011, and 2011 and 2012.
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C Data Gathering Process
The data gathering process was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted on obtaining
detailed information on all the public purchases performed under the menor cuantia processes for
the years 2008-2012. This provided information on each public purchase as well as all individuals
and firms that submitted a bid to participate in each public work. The second phase of the
project consisted on obtaining detailed information on each individual and firm that participated
in the menor cuantia process during the sample period. The third and final phase of the project,
consisted on cleaning and entering this information into a database.
C.1 Phase I
The purpose of this phase was to obtain all public works done under the menor cuantia process
for the years 2008-2012. To do this, I first downloaded a master file that contained all purchases
done by public institutions in Ecuador for the years 2009-2015. The file was downloaded from the
website of the public procurement agency (SERCOP)16
The master file contained all purchases done by the government; including those done under
processes other than the menor cuantia. Next, I selected the universe of all purchases under menor
cuantia, which include their respective dates of publication. For each purchase, the file made
available a description of the procurement process used, a purchase code, dates of the purchase,
and other information. This file, however, did not provide the level of detail needed for the
project. To obtain this additional information, I created a data scrapping code that searched and
downloaded all meta-data. This required doing a personalized search for each public work in the
sample. The gathering was restricted to the purchases which 1) were finalized 2) had a unique id
number and 3) were awarded to only one contractor. 28,957 out of the total 32,551 public works
in the menor cuantia met this criteria and form the universe of public works for the project.
The process above was done in three different batches during the year 2015. The first batch was
a pilot project done in March 2015. The second batch took place between April and June 2015.
The third batch was done in August 2015. For each of the 28,957 files, there were 9 pages that
were downloaded: 1) basic information on the contract including length, terms of payment, and
contacts, 2) information on the important dates of the public work, 3) information on the providers
that had been invited, 4) information on the requirements for the public works, 5) information on
the results of the contest, and 6) information on the providers that were qualified, 7) information
on the products or services that were required, 8) a section for questions and answers, and 9) an
archive with all files for the process.
16The website link is: http://portal.compraspublicas.gob.ec/serc op/analisis-sercop/. After opening the link, it is
necessary to click under “Reportes del Sistema de Contratacio´n Pu´blica” which will provide a login to the database.
Once inside the database, one can choose to download a report containing all information. This file was obtained
on February 15th, 2015
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Figure 1.3: Sample search result for menor cuantia
The figure above presents the search results of a public work. The top part presents the requirements for the contest.
The evaluation part presents, for each bidder, a note stating if they satisfy the requirements. The qualified sections
shows those providers that qualified for the contest. The winner section presents the winner of the contest.
C.2 Phase II
In phase II of the project, I obtained financial information on the firms and individuals that par-
ticipated in the menor cuantia process. The meta-data, gathered in the previous phase, provided
information on all providers that submitted a bid to perform the public work. Each provider has
a unique identification number used for tax purposes (RUC or registro u´nico del contribuyente).
There are two different types of providers: firms and self-employed. By law, financial information
for firms is available at the Superintendencia de Companias, (SUPERCIAS). SUPERCIAS is a
government institution and all companies must provide financial records, tax statements, and con-
tact information to them. SUPERCIAS makes this information publicly available through their
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website.
Repeated requests to obtain the data on companies went unanswered. As a result, an automated
program was created to obtain this information.17 I downloaded two types of data. The first
included basic company information and was scrapped directly from the website. The second
included all yearly financial statements on record for that company.
C.3 Phase III
In this phase of the project, I had to enter the financial information into a database. The statements
were stored as PDF documents in two different formats: 1) a scanned image and/or 2) a structured
document. To obtain the financial data from the structured document, I ran several scripts to do
so automatically. Figure 1.4 provides a sample of this type of balance. For balances that were
scanned copies of documents, the data was entered manually and verified by at least an additional
worker and was tested using accounting principles. Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 provide an example
of the financial information available as scanned documents.
The final phase involved testing all information gathered to ensure it was consistent.
17In order to minimize the risk of skipping some companies, I performed the scraping 3 times on those companies
I was not able to find.
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Figure 1.4: Sample financial information
The figure above presents a financial return available as a structured format. The data from this balance was
extracted using automated script.
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Figure 1.5: Sample financial information
The figure contains a financial return available as scanned copies. The data from this balance was obtained via-
manual entry.
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Figure 1.6: Sample financial information
The figure contains a financial return available as scanned copies. The data from this balance was extracted
via-manual entry.
D Sample selection
A total of 1,920 registered firms participated in the process. To obtain the firm’s financial informa-
tion, I used the unique tax identification number and performed a search on the Superintendencia
de Compan˜ias’ (SUPERCIAS) website. I was able to obtain information on 1836 firms. The
remaining 84 firms did not have a record. Out of the 1836, there were 661 firms that won, at
least once, a contest where there was only one qualified participant for the lottery. These 661
firms participated in a total of 3,160 public contests. I exclude from the sample these firms. The
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dataset that combines the results from the lottery with confidential tax-level data. I find that
income shocks cause households to increase spending in education and health by 8%, and in
food and clothing by 11% during the year of the shock. I also find that households that
received shocks of higher magnitudes smooth their expenditures over time.
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2.1 Introduction
Understanding how households react to changes in income has been a perennial area of research
in development economics.1 Research on this subject can be used at a macro and micro economic
level to help, for instance, estimate monetary and fiscal multipliers and model the effects of public
policies. To properly address this question, it is essential to identify if the shock is expected or
unexpected and if it is temporary or permanent (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010; Blundell et al.,
2008). Equally important, the researcher must account for measurement error, especially when
examining more than one variable at a time (Pistaferri, 2015). Addressing both issues concurrently
remains a challenge in the literature.
In this paper, I estimate the causal effects of temporary and unexpected income shocks on ex-
penditures in non-durable consumption and human capital. To this purpose, I use confidential tax
deduction data from the National Tax Collection Agency of Ecuador and examine the expenditures
claimed by 2,902 single-income households on education and health (human capital) and clothing
and food (non-durable consumption) for the years 2009-2012. The heads of the households in
the sample provided services to the Ecuadorian government under a process that selects vendors
using a random lottery. I use the exogenous variation in household income created by the lottery
to causally estimate the impact of income shocks on expenditures at the extensive and intensive
margin.
The unique dataset and setting are particularly relevant to answer this empirical question.
The increase in household income for households that benefited from the lottery is exogenous,
temporary, and unexpected. Therefore, households that did not benefit from the lottery serve
as an appropriate counterfactual to obtain unbiased estimates of income shocks. Tax deductions
provide a reliable measure of expenditure as they reflect actual purchases and must be accompanied
by receipts. As a result, I am able to jointly estimate expenditures in non-durable consumption
and human capital.2
I find that during the year of the shock, households that benefited from the lottery spend,
on average, between 11% more in non-durable consumption and 8% more in human capital as
compared to those households that did not win. At the intensive margin, the results suggest an
income elasticity of expenditure of 0.13 for human capital and 0.2 for non-durable consumption. I
also find evidence that, for shocks of higher monetary amounts, the effects are observed the year
after the shock.
This study contributes to the literature that examines how consumption and human capi-
1For an overview of the literature see (Becker and Tomes, 1986; Souleles, 1999; Banerjee, 2004; Frankenberg
and Thomas, 2017). The source of income shocks studied in the literature include: economic conditions, weather
changes, conflict, and assistance programs.
2An obvious concern on the use of tax data to infer expenditure is its reliability. The data section provides
evidence indicating that the tax-information used in this study represents objective and real expenditures.
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tal respond to temporary changes in income. Souleles (1999) analyzes the consumption of U.S.
households after receiving a tax refund and finds excess sensitivity to shocks, particularly among
liquidity constraint households. Parker et al. (2013) look at consumption following the 2008 stim-
ulus package in the United States, and find that households spend up to a third of their additional
income on non-durables. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) show that, following an increase in income
from an unconditional cash transfer, household consumption increased by 23%, medical expenses
increased by 38%, and expenditures in education by 19%.
The main contribution of this paper to the literature is that it examines an income shock
that is unexpected, positive and temporary. In this particular setting, the shock comes from
an increase in labor supplied by the household head, as opposed to tax rebates or cash handouts.
Furthermore, the unique dataset allows me to provide estimates for both non-durable consumption
and human capital, areas which have traditionally been studied separately. One of the limitations
of the data is that, due to administrative data restrictions, I can only measure expenditures at the
aggregate household level. As a result, I cannot study how the shock is allocated within the family.
Nonetheless, the results provide further evidence that non-durable consumption and human capital
investment respond strongly to transitory changes in household income.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: section 2.2 discusses a theoretical framework to
analyze the role of income shocks on household expenditures. Section 2.3 describes the institutional
context. Section 2.4 describes the data. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 2.6
presents the results and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical framework
In this section, I present a simple dynamic model based on Cunha and Heckman (2007) and
Carneiro and Ginja (2016) that illustrates the theoretical implications of income shocks on house-
hold consumption and human capital investment. Consider a household made-up of one parent and
one child. The parent is the sole income earner and decides how to allocate her income between
household consumption and child-specific goods. The parent supplies labor inelastically, is always
employed and receives an exogenous wage, wt. Parents are altruistic and leave no bequest to their
children. Children are born with a level of ability, hc. This ability does not depreciate and can
increase by investing in child specific goods, gt.
For a given level of assets ait, wage wit, and human capital, hit−1, the parent maximizes house-
hold consumption, ct, and child investment, gt, to solve:
max
ct,gt




subject to the budget constraint at+1
1+r
= at + wt − ct − gt and the human capital production
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function of the child ht = f(ht−1, gt). If credit constraints are binding, an additional constraint is
that at ≥ 0
In general, there is no analytical solution for equation 1. Carneiro and Ginja (2016) show that











Where Uc and Uh denote the marginal utility of consumption and human capital, respectively.
Equation 2 is the familiar Euler equation for consumption. Equation 3 suggests that parents equate
the ratio of investment between periods. This, in turn depends on the degree of substitutability
(inter-temporal elasticity of substitution) between periods. If investments are substitutes, then
parents can save one period and invest in the other without affecting the human capital of the
child. If they are complements, then late investments might not compensate for missing past
investments. This set-up illustrates that investments in children depend, among other things, on
past investments and the level of human capital of the child.
Expression 2 can only be obtained by assuming no credit constraints, perfect foresight, and
parental knowledge of the human capital production function. Heckman and Mosso (2014) high-
light additional complications in models that consider credit imperfections and stochastic income.
Consequently, the role of income shocks on changes in human capital investment and consumption
is not conceptually straightforward to identify.
2.3 Institutional Setting
In this section, I first provide a brief overview of menor cuantia, a procurement process that
randomly selects winning bidders for public tenders. This process is discussed in depth in the
previous chapter; for the sake of brevity, I only discuss its main features. I then describe the tax
deduction process in Ecuador, which I use as the data source to capture household expenditures.
2.3.1 Menor cuantia
Ecuador is a developing country with a dollarized economy since the year 2001 and a 2016 GDP
per capita of $6,205. Between the years 2005-2014 a high international price of oil financed a
wave of public spending in the country. In 2008, a reform to the public procurement law was
enacted, whereby all government purchases were centralized. As part of this reform, and of essential
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importance for this paper, was the creation of the so-called menor cuantia public procurement
mechanism.
Menor cuantia is a process designed for public works whose value is below .0007% of the
government budget.3 For the years 2009-2012, the threshold to use the process was approximately
$150,000 (2012 nominal USD). The process works through an online portal that connects suppliers
with public institutions. To start the process, a public institution must create a new entry in the
online platform which includes a description of the project and a set of requirements. Once an
entry is created, potential suppliers that are registered in the system can submit their bids for the
project. They do so by expressing their interest and uploading legal documents that verify they
satisfy the requirements.
A public committee then evaluates all of the potential suppliers that submitted bids. The
goal of the committee is to identify those providers that meet the minimum requirements stated
in the project. Those that do so enter into a pool of qualified candidates. In the final phase of
the process, the system automatically and randomly selects a winner from the pool of qualified
candidates identified by the committee. This candidate is the winner of the contest (hereafter
provider) and is assigned the public contract.
A priori, the design of the process suggests that, conditionally on qualifying to enter the random
draw, the observed and unobserved characteristics of providers are orthogonal to the outcome of
the lottery. This is corroborated by the fact that contracts are not awarded based on individual
characteristics and that there is no negotiation between institutions and bidders, as the price for
a given public work is fixed. Additionally, the requirements that are set for each contract are
defined in terms of objective criteria, and are certified by legal documents. The random allocation
of contracts, however, is ultimately an empirical matter tested in section 2.5.
2.3.2 Tax Deductions
The Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI) is the government agency responsible for collecting taxes in
Ecuador. The SRI collects three types of taxes: value added taxes for certain goods and services,
personal income taxes, and special taxes on international transfer fees, estates, and lotteries (Bohne
and Nimczik, 2016). The data for this project comes from personal income taxes which all income
earners must file. Taxes are progressive and based on a tax-schedule that varies from year to year
(see Table 2.1). Joint tax filing is not allowed; if a household has two or more income-earners, each
of them must file their taxes separately.
3This process consists mostly of new construction or remodeling projects. Before procuring a new public work,
it must be approved in the budgetary process which occurs at least one year before the public work is expected to
begin.
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Table 2.1: Tax Schedule in Ecuador for the year 2016
Minimum Maximum Tax Amount Tax Rate
0 11,170 0 0%
11,170 14,240 0 5%
14,240 17,800 153 10%
17,800 21,370 509 12%
21,370 42,740 938 15%
42,740 64,090 4,143 20%
64,090 85,470 8,413 25%
85,470 113,940 13,758 30%
113,940 113,940+ 22,299 35%
The following table describes the tax schedule for 2016. The first and second column show the minimum and
maximum values for a given tax bracket. The fourth column shows the tax rate for a given bracket. The values
shown are in U.S. dollars (the official currency of Ecuador). Source-Tax Authority of Ecuador.
Individuals can deduct from their taxable income expenses incurred in the following five cate-
gories: education, health, food, clothing, and housing. The total deductions can reach up to 50%
of the gross income amount or up to 1.35 the tax-exempt value, whichever is the lowest.4 Common
deductions include: payments for school tuition, school transportation, uniforms, school books,
purchase of groceries, alimony payment, purchase of clothes and shoes, remodeling of a house,
payment of housing utilities, medicine, and health services. To claim a deduction, an individual
must have a corresponding receipt assigned to their unique tax identification number, a process
usually done at the time of purchase. Deductions for a given receipt can be claimed only once.
The information from tax deductions provide a reliable measure of spending that overcomes some
of the limitations of survey data. The advantages of using tax deductions is that they are based
on actual purchases. In addition, households have an incentive to report the expenses, as it lowers
their tax burden. In contrast to surveys, however, tax deductions do not capture informal and/or
small purchases.
2.4 Data
I use a unique dataset that combines detailed level data on all procurement contracts done between
2009-2012 under menor cuantia with individual tax-level data for the years 2006-2013. Data for
4 The maximum amount individuals can claim on health expenditures is 135% of the tax-exempt values. For
food, clothing, housing, and education, this value is 32.5% of the tax-exempt value. For example, using the tax
schedule for 2016 presented in Table 2.1, an individual making $15,000 during 2016, could claim total deductions
of up to $7,500. The maximum amount deducted from each area, except for medical expenditures, is $4,875.
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menor cuantia was constructed by scraping the information from the National Procurement Agency
(SERCOP).5 Data for tax deductions comes from the National Tax Authority of Ecuador (SRI).
Additional regional data used to control for economic variables comes from the national statistical
institute of Ecuador (INEC).
The dataset allows me to match data on the amount received from menor cuantia to household
expenditures. I only examine households with one-income earner during the year of the contest
that participated and qualified in the menor cuantia process.6
Due to administrative limitations, demographic information was not available from the SRI. I
supplemented this data with proprietary information that includes: household composition, age of
children, and marital status from a large Ecuadorian financial institution. Due to confidentiality
reasons this information is only used to control for household characteristics in the empirical
estimations.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Contracts (2010-2012)
The figure above provides the contract amount of the 14,589 public works in the sample performed between the
years 2010-2012. The values for public works are presented in U.S. dollars.
The dataset contains information on 2,902 heads of household that participated in 14,589
public works for the years 2009-2012. Figure 2.1 provides the distribution of contract amounts for
the period 2009-2012. Public works done under menor cuantia have an average value of $45,414
and approximately 85% of the contracts last less than three months. The number of contracts
5See appendix in the previous chapter for description of the data gathering process.
6I only consider individuals that participated as individual contractors and not as a representative of a firm.
Individual contractors bid for projects as natural citizens. For tax purposes, they report this income on their
personal income tax forms. Individuals that are also representatives of firms follow other reporting procedures.
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grew from 1,077 in 2009 to 4,256 in 2010, declining slightly in 2011 and 2012. On average, each
contract had 13 qualified providers, the minimum being 2 and the maximum 156. The breakdown
of participants per year is as follows: 2010 had 2,305 providers that participated (1349 won); 2011
had 2,103 providers that participated (1231 won); 2012 had 1,695 providers that participated (963
won). The average contract consists of a set of 6 requirements that providers need to satisfy to
qualify for the draw. Common requirements include: previous professional experience in public
works, registry of machinery, and educational certificates.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of providers
Avg. SD. Obs. Min Max
Age (Years) 45 11 9,202 22 83
Expenditure on clothing (USD) 1,299 825 652 4 4,308
Expenditure on food (USD) 2,153 1,076 652 45 7,140
Expenditure on education (USD) 1,667 1,115 652 3 6,318
Expenditure on health (USD) 1,393 1,111 652 12 7,152
1 Descriptive statistics of 2,902 heads of household participating in the
menor cuantia process for the years in the sample. Values are arithmetic
averages. Age is presented in years while expenditure is in USD.
The heads of household that participated in the contracts consists of mostly adult males (92%).
The average individual won 1.4 contracts during the sample period. Out of the 2,902 heads of
household, 966 of them did not win a contract during the time period. The average winner of the
bid is 45 years old, 70% of which are married, 22% single, and 8% divorced. The majority (93%)
have a high school education. The average household head reported a monthly income of $1,534
before taxes. The highest deduction for tax purposes is on food ($2,153), followed by education
($1,667), health ($1,393) and clothing ($1,299). For households that won a contract, the reported
average monthly income (after deductions) is $408 more than those that did not win a contract.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that, under the menor cuantia process, the
allocation of contracts is exogenous to any individual characteristics that also affect expenditures
on non-durable consumption and human capital. To test this proposition, I do a difference in
means test between winners and runners-up of the contracts for each year between 2010 and 2012,
presented in Table 2.3. There are no significant differences between both groups in total income,
age, civil status, and deductions on housing, and health at the 10% level. For education, the
runner-ups show higher expenditures for the years 2011 and 2012. This result, however, is due
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Table 2.3: Difference in means Student t-test results by year
Variable Runners-up Winner P-value
2010
Expenditure on clothing ($) 1010.32 907.05 0.54
Expenditure on education ($) 1615.54 2049.30 0.24
Expenditure on health ($) 875.22 934.95 0.72
Expenditure on food ($) 2697.07 2973.24 0.54
Age (Years) 45.04 44.89 0.73
Gross income ($) 27039.24 27389.39 0.75
2011
Expenditure on clothing ($) 983.05 1130.74 0.44
Expenditure on education ($) 2312.14 1542.96 0.04
Expenditure on health ($) 1169.24 1101.63 0.76
Expenditure on food ($) 2112.51 2242.39 0.72
Age (Years) 45.43 45.00 0.35
Gross income ($) 22223.24 23488.69 0.27
2012
Expenditure on clothing ($) 1139.80 1302.90 0.40
Expenditure on education ($) 1819.35 1352.54 0.08
Expenditure on health ($) 1165.07 1666.53 0.10
Expenditure on food ($) 1750.28 1841.53 0.69
Age (Years) 45.00 45.40 0.47
Gross income ($) 23579.57 23556.32 0.98
1 Difference in means for individuals participating in the menor cuantia con-
test. The variables are the lags of the log values.
to a few households that reported high amount during those years.7 Further tests based on the
actual and theoretical distributions of winners provide additional evidence that the assignment of
contracts is in fact random.8
The sample for this study consists only of one-income households that participated in menor
cuantia. By focusing on this sample, I avoid instances with endogenous changes in the total labor
supplied by the household that would occur if, for instance, winning a contract changes the hours
worked by a spouse. Given that the amount received from menor cuantia is exogenous, one could
estimate its effects on non-durable consumption and human capital expenditures separately using
the following reduced form equations:
consumptionit = β0 + β1incomeit +Xitβ2 +Wtβ3 + δ1i + 1it (4)
human capitalit = ρ0 + ρ1incomeit +Xitρ2 +Wtρ3 + δ2i + 2it (5)
7Although there is a limit on the amount of tax deductions that household can claim in each area, the tax data
show certain households that exceeded this threshold. The results of the paper remain unchanged if I exclude these
households.
8This question is discussed in more detail in the previous chapter.
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where consumptionit and human capitalit denote the log expenditures of household i during year
t in non-durable consumption and human capital, respectively. The variables Xi are household
specific observables, Wt, is a vector of economic conditions, and δi is a time fixed effect. To estimate
the effects of income shocks at the extensive margin, I set the variable income to be a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the head of household i won a contract during the year t and 0 otherwise.
The extensive margin analysis shows the average differences in expenditure between winners and
runners-up during time t. To measure the intensive margin, I set income to be equal to the log
amount that the household obtained from the menor cuantia, thereby providing a measure of
sensitivity of expenditures.
Equations 4 and 5 could be estimated separately using ordinary least squares; however, doing
so does not take into account the potential correlation between human capital and consumption
and does not allow to estimate how income shocks affect both variables jointly (Wooldridge, 2010).
As a result, I estimate equations 4 and 5 jointly using seemingly unrelated regression (SURE).9
A limitation of this specification is that it provides a measure of expenditure and not actual
consumption. This implies that I cannot distinguish between expenditures due to changes in
quantity and those due to a change in quality. Nonetheless, under the mild assumption that both
human capital and non-durable consumption are normal goods, the coefficient, β1, is unbiased
and can provide an appropriate, though imprecise, measure of the effects of household income on
actual consumption and human capital investment.
A possible problem that comes with using tax deductions to measure expenditure, is the mis-
reporting of receipts. Businesses have an incentive to avoid issuing receipts to reduce their tax
burden. They could, in principle, offer discounts to buyers if they do not request them. A parallel
concern is that households close to the threshold of permitted deductions do not have an incentive
to declare expenditures beyond this limit. While it is not possible to empirically test these concerns,
they would, most likely, bias the results towards zero. Households that benefited from the lottery
have, on average, a higher household income during the year of the shock. Taking into account that
there is a correlation between household income and tax deductions, this suggests underreporting
will be more likely in those households that benefited from the lottery.
2.6 Results
In this section, I present the results of the effect of income shocks on household expenditure at the
intensive and extensive margin. For brevity of presentation, I combine expenditures on education
and health labeling them as “human capital” and expenditures on clothing and food labeling them
9Note that a second possible estimation strategy would be to use the value from the menor cuantia as an
instrument for household income. In this set-up, the estimation would be done using a system of equations via
generalized methods of moments (GMM). For the sake of simplicity, I present the results using SURE. However,
the results are quantitatively similar if I estimate it using the system GMM.
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Figure 2.2: Differences in log expenditures between winners and runners-up
The figure above shows the differences in log expenditures between winners and runners-up of the menor cuantia
process for the years leading (-1), the year during (0), and the year after (1) the contest. Non-durable consumption
refers to clothing and food expenditures while human capital refers to health and education. The lines represent
the 95% confidence interval.
as “non-durable consumption”.
I first compare graphically the change in expenditures in human capital and non-durable con-
sumption between the winners and runners-up of the menor cuantia process, shown in Figure 2.2.
The point estimates and confidence intervals are obtained from a two-tailed Student-t test. I do
the comparison for the years leading to, the year of, and the year after the shock. The left panel
shows the differences in non-durable consumption while the right panel shows differences in human
capital. As expected, there are no significant differences the year before the shock. During the
year of the shock, the differences between runners-up and winners are significant. The year after
the shock, these differences are positive but, due to the larger standard error, are not statistically
different from zero.
Table 2.4 presents the results formally. The dependent variables are the log expenditures
in human capital (upper panel) and non-durable consumption (lower panel). The independent
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household won a contract during the year. The
results show that non-durable consumption expenditure increased by approximately 11% during
the year of the shock. The results are statistically significant at the 1% level and robust to the
inclusion of region, time and household fixed effects. In pecuniary terms, this implies that, on
average, winners of the contracts increase their expenditure in non-durable consumption by $400.
For human capital, the results show an increase of 8%, implying an average increase in expenditures
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Table 2.4: Effects of income shocks on household expenditure, extensive margin
Year of shock Year after shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Non-durable consumption
Winner 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Human Capital
Winner 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
Household Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3520 3520 3520 3178 3616 3616 3616 3271
R2 0.012 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.003 0.009 0.017 0.018
1 Seemingly unrelated regression of the effects of winning a procurement contract on human capital
expenditures and non-durable consumption. The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if a head of household won a contest at time t. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the individual level. P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
of $260. The results for human capital are statistically significant after including household fixed
effect but become insignificant once I add regional controls. This, however, is due to the loss of
10% of the observations when including such controls.
Winning a contract during the year has an impact both on non-durable consumption and
human capital.10 Next, in columns 5 to 8 of Table 2.4, I check to see if the effects of income shocks
persist the year after the shock. The year after the shock, non-durable consumption expenditures
of winners are still higher than those for non-winners, suggesting an 8% difference. The coefficients
for human capital are not statistically significantly different from zero.
Overall Table 2.4 suggests that a change in household income affects non-durable consumption
and human capital. The extensive margin allows to estimate average responses but does not allow
to examine the sensitivity of the results. To do this, I look at the intensive margin, presented in
Table 2.4. The dependent variables are the log expenditures of human capital and non-durable
consumption for the year of the shock. The independent variable is the log of the total value
received from menor cuantia. The joint estimation suggest that, during the year of the shock, an
increase in 10% in the value of menor cuantia increases total household expenditure in human
capital and non-durable consumption by 1.3 and 2%, respectively. The results are robust to the
inclusion of household characteristics and regional controls. In columns 5-8, I examine the results
for the year after the shock. The results are similar in magnitude and statistical significance.
10The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that non-durable consumption and human capital are equal to zero
at level α=0.001
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Table 2.5: Effects of income shocks on household expenditure, intensive margin
Year of shock Year after shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Long Term
Log menor cuantia 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Short Term
Log menor cuantia 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Time Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
Household Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1442 1442 1442 1442 1496 1496 1496 1496
R2 0.009 0.021 0.022 0.024 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.008
1 Seemingly unrelated regression of the effects of winning a procurement contract on human capital
expenditures and non-durable consumption. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
individual level. P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
Comparing the results with the extensive margin, a possible explanation to this finding is that
with increases in income, households can distribute the additional income in other years, thereby
smoothing expenditures.
I perform several specification tests, shown in the appendix, to analyze the sensitivity of the
results. The results are robust to performing the analysis year by year, using household fixed
effects, the use of other estimation techniques, and different definitions of growth.
Overall, the results show that households have a high propensity to consume out of temporary
and positive income shocks. Compared to the literature, the elasticities found in this study are
consistent with other findings, albeit smaller in magnitude. How generalizable are these results?
One limitation of the study is that it relies on single-income households. Due to the nature of
the contests, these households are also in the construction sector and are formed by self-employed
and small firm owners. As such, this particular sample might have more experience with financial
planning that the entire population.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effects that income shocks have on household expenditures on human
capital and non-durable consumption. Using a unique quasi-experimental setting as an exogenous
source of household income, I compare how different single-income earner households respond to
a positive and temporary shock. I find that households affected by an income shock increase their
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spending in education and health and food and clothing during the year of the shock. This increase
in expenditure is also observed the year after the year following the shock. The results suggest an
elasticity of non-durable consumption and human of 0.13 and 0.2, respectively.
The results of this study contribute to the mounting evidence that suggest that, contrary to the
predictions of life-cycle models and the Permanent Income Hypothesis, households respond strongly
to temporary shocks. Further research should explore how different conditions, particularly credit-
constraints and the composition of the household, affect how temporary shocks are allocated.
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A Robustness
In this section, I present the sensitivity of the results to several specification tests.
In Table 2.6, I present the results for non-durable consumption. Columns 1-5 present the
extensive margin results. Column 1 reports the results using household fixed effects. In columns
2-4, I report the results, running each year individually. In column 5, I use an alternative definition
of growth y˙ = yt−yt−1
.5∗yt+yt−1 . Columns 6-10 present the intensive margin results. Column 6 reports
the results using household fixed effects. In columns 7-9, I report the results running each year
individually. In column 10 I estimate the effects using an alternative definition of growth.
Table 2.6: Effects of income shocks on non-durable consumption expenditure, year of shock
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Winner 0.68∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.08 0.21∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Log menor cuantia 0.07 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03
(0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 6826 1158 1105 982 6419 4322 553 512 508 4144
R2 0.018 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.379 0.010 0.031 0.024 0.000 0.397
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on non-durable consumption expen-
ditures. The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a head of household won a contest at
time t. The variable menor cuantia is the log total amount received from menor cuantia. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
In Table 2.7, I present the results on human capital expenditure. Columns 1-6 present the
extensive margin results. Column 1 reports the results using household fixed effects. In columns
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2-4, I report the results running each year individually (2010-2012). Column 5 uses an alternative
definition of growth y˙ = yt−yt−1
.5∗yt+yt−1 . Columns 6 uses the alternative definition of growth with
household fixed effects. Columns 7-11 present the intensive margin results. Column 7 reports
the results using household fixed effects. In columns 8-10, I report the results running each year
individually. sFinally column 11 uses the alternative definition of growth.
Table 2.7: Effects of income shocks on household expenditure on human capital,
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Winner 0.66∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.04 0.06 0.15∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05)
Log menor cuantia 0.03 0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.04 0.01
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Observations 6826 1153 1115 976 6419 6419 4322 557 512 507 4144
R2 0.016 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.380 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.001 0.384
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on human capital expenditures. The variable
winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a head of household won a contest at time t. The variable menor cuantia
is the log total amount received from menor cuantia. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual
level. P-values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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Chapter 3
Income Shocks and Children’s Educational
Development: The Case of Uganda
Abstract
The economics literature has documented that income shocks have an enduring and per-
sistent effect on children’s educational development. We study this in the context of Uganda,
where we measure how income shocks, stemming from unanticipated weather variation, im-
pact children in four key areas of education: school attendance, educational expenditures,
child labor, and competency levels in mathematics. We proxy the variations in income with
deviations in sub-county-level rainfall from the long-term average. To interpret the results,
we propose a simple theoretical framework which allows us to decompose income shocks into
two opposing forces: an income effect and a substitution effect. We show that the interaction
of these two forces can lead to heterogeneous effects across households.
Overall, we find that an increase in household income, in the form of a one standard devi-
ation increase in rainfall from the long-term average, increases the odds of children attending
school by 25%, increases school expenditures by 13%, decreases the odds of child labor by
19% and increases the odds for children to reach a higher level of proficiency in mathematics
by 3%. When we distinguish across household types, we find that income shocks have almost
no effect on school attendance and child labor for children from subsistence-farming house-
holds. The main contribution of this paper is that it shows that even within the same country,
income shocks have heterogeneous effects. By disaggregating across households, our results
help reconcile some of the seemingly conflicting results previously found in the literature.
Keywords: Income shocks, education, child labor
J.E.L. Codes: D13, N37
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3.1 Introduction
“By the year 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality
primary and secondary education...”
Sustainable Development Goal 4, target 1
In many developing countries, poor economic conditions and child labor often stand in the way
of children’s education, particularly in the absence of adequate social protections (Fitzsimons,
2007; Banerjee, 2004; Doran, 2013). Due to its importance and relation to education, the impact
that income shocks have on children’s schooling and labor is a question that has been studied
extensively in the literature (see for instance, Carneiro and Ginja, 2016; Haushofer and Shapiro,
2016; Shah and Steinberg, 2015).
Notwithstanding the numerous studies on the topic, there is still not an unequivocal answer to
this question. On one hand, some studies have found a positive link between income shocks and
children educational development. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) examine an unconditional cash
transfer program in Kenya and suggest that educational expenditures are highly sensible to income
changes. Edmonds et al. (2011) conclude that increases in schooling rates in India were mainly
due to a reduced cost of schooling (see also: Bourguignon, 2003; Beegle et al., 2006; De Janvry
et al., 2006). On the other hand, some studies have documented evidence of increased occurrence
of child labor during periods of economic growth (Kruger, 2007; Rogers and Swinnerton, 2004).
For instance, Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003) show that employment rates increase in boys
14-16 as local labor market opportunities improve.
A potential reason for such diverse findings in the literature is that households develop miti-
gating strategies to deal with income shocks but their effectiveness “var[ies] with the context in
ways that are not straightforward to measure or model” (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2017). Soares
et al. (2012) argue that these seemingly conflicting empirical findings can be reconciled under a
simple theoretical framework, which decomposes income shocks into two forces: an income effect
and a substitution effect. Positive income shocks increase household revenue, making schooling
more affordable. Concurrently, income shocks, in the form of higher expected wage rates, also
increase the opportunity cost of schooling.
In this paper we estimate the effects that income shocks, stemming from unanticipated weather
variation, have on children’s educational development. We address this question for the case of
Uganda for four key areas of education: school attendance, educational expenditures, child labor,
and proficiency in grade-2 level mathematics. Uganda provides a good setting to implement
this study, as agriculture employs about 70% of the population and crops are mostly rain-fed
(Hausmann et al., 2014). To guide the empirical analysis, we build on Soares et al. (2012) and
adapt a theoretical framework to the Ugandan context. We show how the relative magnitude of
the income and substitution effects can have heterogeneous implications for different households.
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Our data come from two separate sources that measure complementary outcomes. While both
datasets are representative at the national level, they are based on different samples, making
it unfeasible to merge them together. To capture child-specific school attendance, educational
expenditures, and child labor, we use longitudinal household survey data from the Uganda National
Panel Survey (UNPS) for the years 2010 to 2012. To capture child proficiency in mathematics, we
use data from the Uwezo project for the years 2010 to 2015.1
Our identification strategy relies on using standardized rainfall deviations from the long-term
average, as a direct proxy of income shocks (Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, 2013). Due to data limitations,
we use rainfall deviation as a direct proxy for income shocks, instead of using it as an instrumental
variable.2 We argue that this direct proxy captures the income channel, rather than other channels,
by controlling for other rain-related outcomes identified in the literature. We match this deviation
at the sub-county level, the second lowest administrative level in Uganda. Using rainfall deviations,
rather than the total yearly rainfall, allow us to account for sub-county-specific climate and provides
a source of unanticipated variation (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2017).3
We find two sets of results. Overall, we find that an income shock, in the form of a one standard
deviation increase in rainfall from the long-term average, increases the odds of children attending
school by 25% and increases child-specific school expenditures by 13%. Similarly, they decrease
the odds that children work by 19% and increase the odds of a child reaching a higher level of
competency level in mathematics by 3%. When we distinguish between subsistence farmers and
other types of households, we find that the effect on school attendance and child labor is almost
null for subsistence farmers. Interpreting these results in light of our theoretical framework, we
argue that subsistence farmers are more sensitive to the substitution effect. Our results are robust
to non-linear effects due to excessive rainfall deviation, alternative definitions of rainfall deviation,
and unobservable selection tests.
The main contribution of this paper is that it shows the heterogeneous effects of income shocks
by differentiating across different types of households. Our results are in line with Edmonds (2006),
in that we find a positive relationship between income shocks and child educational development.
Concurrently, they corroborate Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003), in that we find a quasi-null
effect for subsistence farmers. Our findings highlight the need to account for varying household
conditions when addressing similar areas of research. From a policy perspective, our results empha-
size the need for governments in developing countries to take measures ensuring that all children
1 Uwezo is a non-profit organization that aims to measure the learning proficiency of children in Uganda. It is
funded in part by the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development, and Swedish International.
2We define standardized rainfall deviations as the normalized difference between yearly total rainfall and the
1983-2015 average.
3For instance, in the case of a negative anticipated income shock, parents might take preemptive steps to
smooth investments in children’s education, making it more difficult to identify the relationship between income
and educational inputs and outcomes.
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benefit equally from periods of increased economic opportunity. In the Ugandan context, pub-
lic policy should target subsistence farming households to provide incentives to counteract the
increased opportunity cost of schooling when agricultural conditions improve.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows: section 3.2 provides a simple theoretical framework
to drive the analysis. Section 3.3 introduces the data. Section 3.4 details our identification strategy
and empirical methodology. In section 3.5, we present and discuss our results. We conclude in
section 3.6.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a simple theoretical framework to discuss the expected effects of a
weather-induced income shock on children’s educational development, based on the models devel-
oped by Soares et al. (2012) and Basu and Van (1998). We present it in the context of Uganda,
where a significant part of the workforce is employed in agriculture. We start by showing how
income shocks can be decomposed into an income and a substitution effect. We then suggest that
the theoretical predictions can be heterogeneous across households.
3.2.1 Household consumption and child labor
Consider a household with one parent and one child. The parent decides how much of the child’s
time, tc, is devoted to schooling, sc, and to work, lc, such that tc = sc + lc. The utility function
U(ch, sc) of the household depends on total household consumption, ch, and child schooling, sc. In
addition to satisfying the Inada conditions, we assume that the utility function is separable on ch
and sc.
Employment, li∀i ∈ c, p, takes the form of working on the household farm. The parent supplies
their labor inelastically (tp = lp). The production function of the farm takes the form f(lc, lp) =
αf(lc)+αf(lp), where α denotes an exogenous augmenting factor on labor. This can be interpreted
as the yield of crops due to varying weather conditions- the same labor input will yield a different
crop production under different weather conditions.4 We assume that all the production from the
farm is sold for a market price and spent on consumption, ch, given a unitary price pc, which we
set equal to 1. Under these conditions, the household’s revenue can be written as:
R = f(lc, lp) = αf(lc) + αf(lp) (1)
We assume that there are no direct costs to schooling.5 Additionally, we assume that f(li) =
4In case of improved weather conditions and assuming a partial equilibrium framework, this will imply a higher
household income.
5 Uganda has implemented universal primary and secondary education, thereby reducing, and sometimes elimi-
nating, direct costs to schooling. If we assume that the remaining schooling costs are unaffected by weather-related
income shocks, their addition would not contribute to the intuition presented in this framework.
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βili,∀i ∈ c, p. The parameter βi captures the different productivity between children and their
parents. In cases where βc = βp, child labor is a perfect substitute for adult labor. Expressing
child and adult labor (lc, lp) as a function of their available time (tc, tp), the household budget
constraint can then be written as:
pcch + αβcsc ≤ αβctc + αβptp (2)




s.t. pcch + αβcsc ≤ αβctc + αβptp
(3)







Where Uc and Us are the respective marginal utilities of consumption and schooling. Equations (3)
and (4) help characterize the impact of an exogenous income shock. In this setup, the exogenous
shock comes from a change in α, such as a change in crop yield following a rainfall shock.6 The
term αβcsc captures the opportunity cost of schooling. We see from equation (2) that an increase
in α, ceteris paribus, increases the total revenue of the household, thus creating an income effect.
Assuming that consumption and schooling time are normal goods, this increase in revenue will lead
to an increase in consumption and schooling, thus reducing child labor. Concurrently, however,
an increase in α also increases the opportunity cost of schooling, αβcsc, hence a substitution effect
which increases the time the child spends working. The magnitude of the substitution effect,
depends on the difference between Uc and Us.
Assume that utility U(c, s) is concave on consumption c, and linear on schooling, s, such that
Ucc < Uss, where Ucc and Uss are the second derivatives of utility with respect to consumption
and schooling respectively. This implies that lim
c→0
Uc → ∞ and lim
s→0
Us = a, where a is a positive
constant. The marginal utility of consumption is thus much larger than that of schooling at low
levels of consumption and schooling. As consumption increases, however, the marginal utility
of consumption approaches zero. As such, as the level of consumption and education increases,
the difference between Uc and Us decreases. Consequently, an increase in the opportunity cost
of schooling following a positive rain shock leads to a stronger substitution effect at low levels of
consumption and schooling, leading to heterogeneous effects across household types.
6Note that we assume a monotonic relation between rainfall and crop yield. In the robustness section we check
for non-linear effects of rainfall on crop yields.
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Figure 3.1: Administrative Boundaries of Uganda
This figure shows the administrative boundaries of Uganda for the year 2010. The left pane shows the region
(highest administrative division). The center pane shows the districts (third highest administrative division). The
third pane shows the sub-counties (second lowest administrative division). The blue area denotes water. Source:
Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, own computation.
3.3 Data
We use two separate but complementary data sources to investigate four key areas of child edu-
cational development. To evaluate child-specific school attendance, school expenditure, and child
labor, we use survey data from the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS). We use UNPS data for
waves 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 (2010, 2011 and 2012 henceforth).7 To address child
competency in mathematics we use all available data from the Uwezo project, spanning each year
between 2010 and 2015. UNPS and Uwezo are both representative at the national level, but it
is not possible to match individual or household observations between the two sources, since they
come from different samples.
We match, separately, UNPS and Uwezo data with rainfall data at the sub-county level. Sub-
counties are the second lowest administrative level in Uganda. In 2010, our year of reference for
administrative divisions in Uganda, there were 964 sub-counties in the country (see Figure 3.1).8
Geo-localized data on rainfall come from the Tropical Applications of Meteorology using Satellite
(TAMSAT). We deflate all prices using the consumer price index (CPI) information, with 2005
being the reference year. We use CPI information from Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) for
6 Ugandan cities and deflate using the CPI of the reference city closest to the sub-county.
7At the time of this writing, there were a total of 4 waves available. Starting from wave IV (2012-2013), the
UNPS sampling framework changed and most of the households from waves 2010-2011-2012 were not sampled in
UNPS 2012-2013. As a result we only use waves I, II, and III in our study.
8In Uganda, the administration divisions are: regions, sub-regions, districts, counties, sub-counties, and parishes.
Uganda has undergone significant changes in its administrative structure since the 1990s, going from 38 districts in
1991 to 112 in 2014.
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3.3.1 School attendance, school expenditures and child labor
UNPS is a longitudinal survey implemented by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. In addition to its
panel dimension, UNPS provides a wealth of information on household and child characteristics.9
We select all children aged 6 to 16 years-old for which we were able to match rainfall data.
The selection of the age range 6-16 was done to ensure consistency with Uwezo data. In total, our
UNPS sample includes 7170 children from 2111 different households.
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the households and children included in our UNPS
sample. The left panel displays statistics for all the households and children. It shows that
about 80% of households are located in rural areas. The average household has about 9 members,
including 1.5 infants (0-to-5 years old) and slightly more than 3 children (6-to-16 years old).
Excluding infants, between 35 to 40% of the members of the average household work on the
family farm. This proportion drops to 31 to 34% when focusing specifically on children. The
average household owns assets worth between 6600 and 9500 USD (in 2005 PPP). About half
of the children in our UNPS data are girls. The average child is slightly under 11 years old,
and has 2.6 siblings.10 The central panel of Table 3.1 details statistics for subsistence-farming
households. Subsistence farming households are defined as households whose main source of income
is subsistence farming. The right panel displays the same statistics for households with other main
sources of income. In terms of sample size, roughly half of the households and children in our UNPS
data come from subsistence-farming households. Over 90% of subsistence-farming households are
rural. This proportion drops to 66-77% for other households. Both are similar in terms of household
composition, but subsistence-farming households typically have a higher share of their non-infant
members (45 to 52%) working on the family farm. In the average subsistence-farming household,
38 to 43% of children worked on the family farm the week before the UNPS interview, compared
to only 21 to 32% of children from other types of households. The average subsistence-farming
household owns assets worth only half of what the average other household owns. Child level
characteristics are almost identical in terms of gender, age, relationship to the household head and
number of siblings.
Table 3.2 displays descriptive statistics across survey waves for the outcomes we measure, for
the full sample, and by type of household. 86 to 88% of children in our sample declared to be
attending school at the time of the interview. This proportion is similar across household types.
9The sample was constructed as follows: in 2005 the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) interviewed
7,400 households. For the UNPS, 3,123 out of the 7000 households were selected to be part of the panel surveys
(Waves I-III). The same sample was maintained for the three waves. Households or individuals that had permanently
left the original households were also interviewed. Out of the 3,123 households that were originally sampled for
the UNPS, a total of 2,607, 2,564, and 2,356 households were successfully interviewed in waves I-III, respectively
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2011)
10We define siblings as any other children (not infants) present in the household at the time of interview, regardless
of who is the biological parent.
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Table 3.1: UNPS Household and Child Characteristics
Full Sample Subsistence Farmers Others
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012
N Households 2,151 2,110 2,101 1,068 980 1124 813 1068 941
% Rural Households 78.24 79.05 80.53 92.88 94.59 93.24 76.63 65.92 65.67
% Urban Households 21.76 20.95 19.47 7.12 5.41 6.76 23.37 34.08 34.33
N Individuals in h.h. 8.60 8.87 9.22 8.64 8.96 9.03 8.99 8.82 9.51
N Infants (0-to-5) 1.53 1.57 1.42 1.60 1.55 1.45 1.57 1.58 1.42
N Children (6-to-16) 3.20 3.15 3.13 3.29 3.24 3.13 3.27 3.08 3.14
% Members farm work 40.85 37.84 35.46 52.20 49.05 45.45 37.53 27.02 22.84
% Children farm work 34.47 33.97 31.01 42.91 42.97 37.81 32.13 24.63 21.18
X h.h. Assets (2005 $) 9,557 6,713 6,613 6,907 4,973 4,994 1,2178 8,639 8,698
N Children 5,941 5,985 6,011 3,047 2,867 3,284 2,243 2,948 2,632
% Female Children 49.98 50.89 51.49 49.32 51.00 51.63 49.51 50.83 51.47
X Age 10.92 10.89 10.90 10.96 10.97 10.86 10.93 10.79 10.93
% Children Head 69.24 69.28 69.29 71.20 69.24 70.28 66.59 69.31 68.64
N Siblings 2.60 2.58 2.56 2.68 2.66 2.59 2.65 2.51 2.53
1 This table presents descriptive statistics for households (h.h.) and children in the Ugandan National Panel Survey,
by wave. N refers to the number, % refers to the percentage (in levels), N denotes the mean of individuals, and X
denotes the sample mean. In the case of h.h. statistics (upper panel), “Full sample” refers to all households with at
least one child (6-to-16 y.o.) and for whom we were able to match rainfall data. In the case of child-specific statistics
(lower panel), it includes only the children from those households. “Subsistence-farmers” refers to households that
rely on subsistence farming as their main source of income. “Others” refers to households which are not subsistence
farmers. Note that due to missing values, the number of households and children may not add up perfectly across
columns. Averaged statistics computed with the UNPS sampling weight.
Most children attending school do so at the primary level of education (80 to 86%), followed by
pre-primary (10 to 13%) and secondary education (2 to 8%). These proportions differ significantly
for subsistence-farmers and other types of households. In particular, children from subsistence
farming households are statistically more likely to be enrolled in primary school, but also less likely
to be enrolled in secondary school, in spite of having the same average age as their counterparts.
Regarding school expenditures, households spend, on average, about 40 USD a year per child.
This value drops to 20 USD for children from subsistence-farming households, but reaches up to
67 USD for other households. 35 to 39% of children in the UNPS sample worked the week before
the interview. We define child labor as having engaged in any of the following activities the week
preceding the UNPS interview: working on the household farm, running a business, working for
pay (including on domestic tasks) or working for free in the household business. The vast majority
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of child labor takes the form of work on the household farm (92 to 96%), followed by unpaid work
in the household business (4 to 7%), paid work (2 to 6%), and running a business (1 to 2%).
Child labor is more prevalent among children from subsistence-farming households than for other
households.
Table 3.2: UNPS School Attendance, School Expenditures and Child Labor
Full Sample Subsistence Farmers Others
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012
% Attending School 86.85 86.25 88.61 87.23 86.23 88.26 85.91 86.06 88.80
% Pre-Primary 10.61 12.45 12.82 11.14 11.67 14.20 10.17 13.21 11.36
% Primary 84.27 83.18 81.84 85.66 85.94 82.86 84.11 80.47 80.85
% Secondary and Above 5.12 4.37 5.34 3.20 2.39 2.94 5.72 6.32 7.79
X School Expenditures 41.41 39.99 42.33 24.32 19.66 23.46 52.07 62.34 67.45
% Children Working 38.55 39.86 35.02 46.54 47.70 41.54 36.67 31.70 25.59
% Working on h.h. Farm 93.91 91.97 95.57 97.48 97.27 98.66 91.63 83.63 88.99
% Running a Business 2.24 1.75 0.97 1.48 0.80 0.92 3.53 3.32 1.17
% Working for Pay 6.09 5.50 2.40 4.34 4.76 1.46 7.70 6.72 4.51
% Working in h.h. Business 6.61 6.61 3.77 3.91 2.00 1.32 9.14 13.81 8.87
% Children Sick 33.42 26.18 25.44 24.05 27.17 27.02 34.66 26.20 24.27
1 This table presents descriptive statistics for school attendance and school expenditures, and details the occurrence
of child labor the week preceding the UNPS interview, by wave. Working for pay includes paid domestic work.
Full sample refers to all children (6-to-16 y.o.) for whom we were able to match rainfall data. N refers to the
number, % refers to the percentage (in levels), N denotes the mean of individuals, and X denotes the sample mean.
A child can engage in several forms of labor at the same time, which is why percentages do not necessarily add
up. “Subsistence-farmers” refers to households that rely on subsistence farming as their main source of income.
“Others” refers to households which are not subsistence farmers. Averaged statistics computed with the UNPS
sampling weight.
3.3.2 Math proficiency
The data for children competency comes from the Uwezo project. Uwezo is civil-society driven
initiative, inspired from the successes of Pratham’s Annual Status of Education Reports (ASER)
in India. Uwezo measures the learning proficiency of children in Uganda and are funded, in part,
by the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development, and Swedish International
Development Agency.11 Their findings have been used as a benchmark to monitor performance
between and within countries (Banerjee et al., 2016; Mbiti, 2016; Jones et al., 2014). Uwezo
provides a nationally representative sample of children aged 6 to 16 and includes information on
household and child characteristics.
11They also operate in Kenya and Tanzania. For more information visit http://www.uwezo.net.
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Uwezo tests children on grade-two-level competency tests in mathematics, English, and local
languages. All children take the same test, regardless of age or grade. Uganda is a multilingual
country, with English and Swahili as the official languages and a set of regional languages derived
from Bantu, Nilotic, and Central Sudanic. Due to this variety in spoken languages, we restrict
our analysis to mathematics. In mathematics, children are graded on a scale that ranges from
innumeracy to the ability to perform divisions. The levels are as follows: 1) innumeracy, 2) ability
to count from zero to nine, 3) from ten to ninety-nine, 4) being able to do additions, 5) subtractions,
6) multiplications and 7) divisions.
Our sample on child competency consists of all children in the Uwezo sample attending school
at the time of the interview, and for whom we matched localized rain data. It includes 382 145
children from 129 272 households.
Table 3.3: Uwezo Child Characteristics
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
N Households 12,366 35,350 34,643 33,853 10,629 35,395
N Children 32,725 100,688 92,130 86,898 25,708 84,003
N Attending School 29,299 92,308 85,605 79,398 22,614 72,921
% Primary 93.18 93.62 94.01 98.01 97.63 94.98
% Secondary 6.82 6.38 5.99 1.99 2.37 5.02
% Female Children 49.21 49.35 49.38 49.44 50.03 50.50
X Age 10.84 10.77 10.69 10.57 10.48 10.42
N Siblings 2.34 3.68 2.44 2.94 2.79 3.34
% Mother educ. – None 23.80 18.12 14.92 27.59 22.54 23.09
% Mother educ. – Primary 59.21 64.47 68.27 65.94 64.97 56.99
% Mother educ. – Secondary 14.15 13.23 13.33 5.00 9.74 17.83
% Mother educ. – > Secondary 2.84 4.17 3.47 1.46 2.75 2.09
1 This table shows descriptive statistics for children sampled in the Uwezo projects during waves 2010 to 2015. N
refers to the number, % refers to the percentage (in levels), N denotes the mean of individuals, and X denotes the
sample mean. Averaged statistics are computed only for children attending school, using the Uwezo data sampling
weight.
Table 3.3 displays descriptive statistics on sample size and child characteristics. Uwezo’s geo-
graphical coverage varies across survey waves, which is why the number of households and children
changes significantly across waves. About 89 to 93% of children attend school. Similarly to UNPS,
most of the children in the Uwezo sample are attending primary school. The sample is balanced
across gender, with an average age of slightly less than 11 years-old. Figure 3.2 shows the share of
children by competency levels in mathematics and shows that a quarter of 16 year olds cannot do
divisions.
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Figure 3.2: Share of Children by Competency Level in Uwezo Tests
Note: This figure breaks down mathematics competency for children aged 6-16, by wave year, as reported by Uwezo.
The same test is administered to all children regardless of age or grade. The competency levels are 1) innumeracy,
2) ability to count between 0-9, 3) 10-99, 4) ability to perform additions, 5) subtractions, 6) multiplication, and 7)
divisions.
3.3.3 Rainfall
Uganda is considerably affected by the Inter-Tropical (ITCZ) Convergence Zone, a belt of con-
verging trade winds and rising air (Mubiru et al., 2012; Lazzaroni, Lazzaroni). There are two
agricultural seasons in Uganda: December to May and June to November (Asiimwe and Mpuga,
2007). Rainfall data come from the Tropical Applications of Meteorology using Satellite (TAM-
SAT) data. TAMSAT was established by the University of Reading in the late 1970s and has
benefited in part from collaborations with the Climate Division of the National Centre for Atmo-
spheric Science (NCAS) and the National Centre for Earth Observation (NCEO) Maidment et al.
(2014). TAMSAT precipitation estimates are available at a resolution of .035 degrees (around 4
km.) for all of Uganda between the years of 1983-2015. We define long-term average based on this
time frame. We match precipitation data with each sub-county using the latitude and longitude
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Figure 3.3: Density Distribution of Rainfall Deviation across UNPS Waves
This figure shows the distribution of the standardized rainfall deviation from the long-term average (1983-2015) of
all sub-counties present in the Uganda National Panel Survey and Uwezo, by year. Standardized Rainfall Deviation
(SRD) is defined as
(Rst1−Rs)
σs
, where Rs is the average total yearly rainfall, Rst1 is the measure of total yearly
rainfall at time t− 1, and σs is the standard deviation of total yearly rainfall for the period. Source: TAMSAT.
of its centroid (Maidment et al., 2017; Funk et al., 2015; Maidment et al., 2014).12
For the years 2010 to 2015 the average total rainfall in the country was 1,121 millimeters
per year. The highest rainfall occurred in the sub-counties of Kayonza and Bugaya (over 2500
mm. per year) while the lowest in Tapac, Kalapata, and Kaabong (less than 600 mm. per year).
Throughout this period, most sub-counties experienced a positive deviation from their long-term
average. Figure 3.3 displays a density distribution of standardized rainfall deviations across UNPS
and Uwezo sub-counties. Matched rainfall deviation are normally distributed and are almost
exclusively positive. This suggests that for our sample, most sub-counties experienced rainfall
higher than the long-term average. To check for instances of excessive rainfall or drought, we
used the Standardized Precipitation Index. Only 0.5% of sub-counties in our sample experienced
excessive rainfall and none experienced a drought in the period we study.
12We use the reprojected coordinates from TAMSAT data and match them with the centroid of each sub-county.
The matching is done based on the smallest euclidean distance. The average sub-county has an approximate area
of 200 square kilometers, about twice the area of the city of Paris, France. In the robustness section we control for
sub-county area and assign the district average to those sub-counties with missing information.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
The main identification issue in estimating a causal impact of income shocks on our variables of
interest is to find a measure of income shocks which is exogenous to within-household resource
allocation. Their joint variation can indeed be associated with unobserved factors such as health
shocks (Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, 2013).
To overcome this issue, we follow a well-established literature (Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, 2013; Nord-
man et al., 2017; Maccini and Yang, 2009) and use lagged, sub-county-specific, standardized rainfall
deviations from the long-term average. We define the long-term average as the period ranging from
1983 to 2015, the period for which TAMSAT data is available. Formally our measure is defined
as: (Rst−1−Rs)
σs
where Rst−1 denotes the total rainfall for year t− 1, Rs and σs are the average and
the standard deviation of total yearly rainfall for the period 1983-2015, respectively.13 Note that
we use rainfall shocks as a direct proxy of income shocks instead of using it as an instrumental
variable. We choose to do so for two main reasons. First, the majority of respondents in the
UNPS are not wage earners. Questions pertaining to income ask for their total income received
during varying spells of time. As a result, the responses differ in terms of income received for
time worked. For example, a response might show earnings per week, per hour or per month.
Consequently, imputing a consistent measure across households is problematic and requires us to
use strict assumptions. Second, Uwezo data does not include information on income.
Assume that the relation can be represented by the following reduced form model:
Yihst = α + βSRDst + ihst (5)
Where Y is the outcome of interest (school attendance, school expenditures, child labor, and
competency in mathematics) for child i from household h, residing in sub-county s, during year t.
β is a parameter to be estimated, and  is an error term.
The majority of individuals in Uganda work in agriculture and rely on rain as their main source
of irrigation (Hausmann et al., 2014). As such, meteorological variations in rainfall can reason-
ably be expected to affect household income.14 An obvious concern in claiming that income is
the mechanism through which rainfall deviations affects child educational development is the ex-
istence of other rain-sensitive factors which are related to educational development. For example,
abnormally high rainfall might impact the disease vectors which could in turn affect school atten-
dance. Controlling for these channels is crucial to interpret rainfall deviations as income shocks.
To address this concern, we compiled a list of the channels identified in the literature, and used
13We choose to normalize our rainfall data directly rather than fitting it to a gamma distribution as it is done
in computing the standardized precipitation index (SPI) defined in McKee et al. (1993). We do so to improve the
interpretation of our results, but using the SPI does not change our results, see appendix.
14We find that standardized rainfall deviation (SRD) is positively and significantly related to the natural logarithm
of household assets.
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them as controls or tested for their relation with rainfall deviations in the years of our sample (see
appendix).
We found the following channels, other than income, through which rainfall could affect our
measures of child educational development: health of children, fertility, food prices, land ownership,
access to credit, migration, civil conflict, floods and droughts. In our regressions we control for
health, fertility, and land ownership of the household. To test for conflicts, we use Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP) data from the University of Uppsala. During the years of the sample, we
find no correlation between rainfall deviation and civil conflicts.
An implicit assumption of equation 5 is that rain positively affects income. This might not be
the case for excessive rainfall. In this situation, schools, household assets, or the roads connecting
them might be damaged by floods, making school attendance no longer possible or too costly.
We would then expect a downward bias for the estimated impact of rainfall deviation on school
attendance, and learning outcomes, and an upward bias for child labor. The direction of the bias
resulting from excessive rainfall is unclear. If household assets need maintenance, they may reduce
school expenditures. On the other hand, households with children attending school may have to
contribute to school repairs following excessive rainfall, thereby increasing school expenditures.
To test for the occurrence of the above scenarios in our sample, we use the Standardized Pre-
cipitation Index (SPI) (McKee et al., 1993). The SPI provides a measure which classifies instances
of droughts and flooding. Based on this measure, no sub-county in our sample shows values for
drought and only about 0.5% of sub-counties show flooding conditions.15 In the robustness section,
we also examine the sensitivity of our results to excessive rainfall by looking at non-linear effects,
and controlling for instances of flooding conditions.
Since we use the deviation from the long-term average to measure rainfall, our β parameter
is safe from the influence of unobserved, sub-county-specific, time-invariant characteristics. Sub-
counties with access to more abundant average rainfalls (large Rs) may indeed differ from their
counterparts in dimensions which are relevant for the relationship between income and children’s
educational development (Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, 2013). For instance, since sub-counties with abun-
dant rainfall can sustain more population and more urbanization, their residents could have access
to more diversified income sources, as well as different schooling facilities, such as closer but more
expensive schools. We further condition our estimates on individual and household characteristics,
as measured in UNPS and Uwezo, and take advantage of their time dimension and various levels
of aggregation to add fixed effects. The reduced-form model can be thus written as:
Yihst = α + βRSRDst + βIIihst + βHHhst + δt + δs + ihst (6)
Where I is a set of individual characteristics for child i, and H a set of household’s features. δt
15The SPI measure is categorized as follows: Values between -1 and 1 suggest near normal conditions. Values
between 1 and 1.49 show moderately wet conditions. Values between 1.5 and 1.99 correspond to very wet conditions.
Any values higher than 2 are considered indicative of extremely wet conditions.
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and δs are year and sub-county fixed effects respectively. The coefficient of interest is βR.
We use different estimation techniques to estimate the parameters of equation (6) depending
on the nature of our dependent variable. School attendance is measured as a binary variable and
takes value 1 if the child was attending school during the time of the interview and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, child labor is a binary variable recording whether a given child engaged in any form of
labor during the week before the interview. We therefore estimate the parameters of equation (6)
via logistic regression when considering school attendance and child labor. School expenditures is
a continuous variable defined as the natural logarithm of real total expenditures per child in the
previous year.16 We estimate the coefficients of equation (6) using ordinary least squares when
focusing on school expenditures. Finally, since child competency in mathematics is measured on an
ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 7, we use an ordered logistic regression to estimate the parameters
of equation (6) when the dependent variable is competency levels.
3.5 Results
In this section, we present the results of the impact of income shocks on four key areas of child
development. First, we look at child-specific school attendance, school expenditures, and child
labor. We then test for heterogeneous effects by disaggregating between households that rely on
subsistence farming as their main source of income and those that do not. Next, we look at the
effects on mathematics competency. We conclude by discussing the robustness of our results. For
simplicity, we will refer to a one standard deviation increase in rainfall from the long-term average
as a unitary increase in standardized rainfall deviation (SRD). All results are weighted using the
survey sampling weights. When using UNPS data, we cluster standard errors at the household-
by-wave level and use the following set of controls: gender, age, child relation to the household
head, number of siblings, a binary variable for subsistence farmers, and the natural logarithm of
household assets. When using Uwezo data, we cluster standard errors at the household level and
use the following controls: gender, age, number of siblings, and mother’s education. We present
the results using SRD for the years t− 1 and t− 2 (t− 2 and t− 3 for educational expenditures).
For brevity, we focus only on t − 1, and discuss the results for t − 2 if they are quantitatively
different than the ones for t− 1.
16Since this question refers to the period in t− 1 w.r.t. the interview, we use the corresponding lagged period for
our measure of rainfall shock, that is t− 2.
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3.5.1 School Attendance, School Expenditures and Child Labor
3.5.1.1 Baseline Results
Table 3.4 presents the results for school attendance. Column 1 presents the unconditional effects.
Column 2 adds a set of controls. Column 3 includes year fixed effects, and columns 4 to 6 control
for regional, district and sub-county fixed effects, respectively. Our unconditional estimate is
significant at the 1 percent level and indicates that a unitary increase in standardized rainfall
increments the odds of a child being in school by approximately 34%. As we add controls and
fixed effects, our estimates lose magnitude, although they remain statistically significant. Our
preferred estimate (column 6), indicates that a unitary increase in standardized rainfall increases
the odds of a child attending school by about 27%.
Next, we discuss our results on school expenditures, presented in Table 3.5. Column 1 presents
the unconditional effects. Columns 2 to 7 add controls, including grade and a binary variable for
scholarship recipients. Columns 3 to 7 add year fixed effects and regional, district, sub-county and
household fixed effects, respectively. Column 1 suggests that, on average, a unitary increase in
SRD increases school expenditures by approximately 65%. This estimate is significant at the 1
percent level, as are those of columns 2 to 7. Once we control for child and household observables,
the inclusion of fixed effects does not significantly alter the magnitude or statistical significance
of the rainfall coefficients. Our preferred estimate (column 7), suggests that a unitary increase in
SRD causes school expenditures to increase by 17%.
Table 3.6 presents the results for child labor. Column 1 displays the unconditional effects. We
find that a unitary increase in SRD decreases the odds of child labor by approximately 35%. As we
control for fixed effects, the coefficient progressively loses magnitude and statistical significance.
Overall, using our preferred estimate, we find that a unitary increase in SRD decreases the odds
of child labor by 28%.
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Table 3.4: Regression Results, School Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SRD t− 1 0.292∗∗∗ 0.143∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.158 0.240∗∗
[0.077] [0.086] [0.097] [0.099] [0.099] [0.109]
SRD t− 2 0.509∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗
[0.087] [0.092] [0.096] [0.095] [0.106] [0.109]
Female 0.159∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.150∗∗
[0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.071] [0.073]
Age in Complete Years 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
Child of Household Head 0.123 0.139 0.156∗ 0.159∗ 0.283∗∗∗
[0.086] [0.085] [0.084] [0.085] [0.089]
Number of Siblings in h.h. -0.032 -0.030 -0.040∗ -0.009 -0.005
[0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.025]
Number of Adults in h.h. 0.039 0.039 0.029 0.053∗ 0.037
[0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027]
Number of Infants in h.h. -0.046 -0.048 -0.063∗ -0.013 0.006
[0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.033]
Sick in past 30 days -0.032 -0.049 -0.056 -0.040 -0.026
[0.083] [0.084] [0.086] [0.085] [0.081]
Subsistence Farmer 0.090 0.113 0.131 0.054 0.127
[0.078] [0.079] [0.080] [0.081] [0.078]
ln(Owned Land in Km) -0.017 -0.050∗∗ -0.037 -0.026 -0.003
[0.011] [0.025] [0.024] [0.023] [0.021]
ln(Household Assets) 0.197∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.050∗
[0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027]
Observations 16241 13839 13839 13839 13838 13030
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No Region District Sub-county
1 This table presents the results from estimating equation 6 via logistic regression, where the dependent variable is
school attendance, taking value 1 if the child attended school the week preceding the interview and zero otherwise.
Standardized Rainfall Deviation (SRD) is defined as
(Rst1−Rs)
σs
, where Rs is the average total yearly rainfall for the
period 1983-2015, Rst−1 is the measure of total yearly rainfall at time t − 1, and σs is the standard deviation of
total yearly rainfall for the period 1983-2015. Female, Child of Household Head and Subsistence Farmer are binary
variables. They denote being a female child, being the biological child of the household (h.h). head, and living in
a subsistence-farming household, respectively. The estimates are weighted using UNPS sampling weights. Robust
standard error in squared brackets, clustered at household-by-wave level. ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance
level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
67
Table 3.5: Regression Results, School Expenditures per Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SRD t− 2 0.508∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
[0.058] [0.045] [0.048] [0.046] [0.048] [0.043] [0.035]
SRD t− 3 0.188∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.016 0.017 0.170∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
[0.068] [0.052] [0.051] [0.051] [0.055] [0.047] [0.039]
Female -0.100∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.033
[0.023] [0.023] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020]
Age in Complete Years 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.017∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Child of Household Head 0.143∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
[0.037] [0.037] [0.035] [0.032] [0.030] [0.042]
Receives a Scholarship -1.418∗∗∗ -1.419∗∗∗ -1.292∗∗∗ -1.238∗∗∗ -1.182∗∗∗ -0.950∗∗∗
[0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.038] [0.036] [0.045]
Grade 0.238∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011]
Number of Siblings in h.h. -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.014 -0.021∗∗ -0.012
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.018]
Number of Adults in h.h. 0.058∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.003
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.020]
Number of Infants in h.h. -0.050∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.008
[0.016] [0.016] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.024]
Sick in past 30 days 0.099∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.067∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.039∗
[0.040] [0.041] [0.039] [0.032] [0.024] [0.024]
Subsistence Farmer -0.290∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗ 0.077∗
[0.036] [0.036] [0.034] [0.030] [0.030] [0.041]
ln(Owned Land in Km) -0.003 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006
[0.005] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
ln(Household Assets) 0.172∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.015]
Observations 12392 9534 9534 9534 9534 9534 9534
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.555 0.556 0.582 0.626 0.668 0.758
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No Region District Sub-county Household
1 This table presents the results from estimating equation 6 via OLS, where the dependent variable is the natural




where Rs is the average total yearly rainfall for the period 1983-2015, Rst1 is the measure of total yearly rainfall
at time t − 1, and σs is the standard deviation of total yearly rainfall for the period. Female, Child of Household
Head, Receives a Scholarship and Subsistence Farmer are binary variables. They denote being a female child, being
the biological child of the household (h.h.) head, receiving a scholarship and living in a subsistence-farming h.h.,
respectively. The estimates are weighted using UNPS sampling weights. Robust standard error in squared brackets,
clustered at household-by-wave level. ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
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Table 3.6: Regression Results, Child labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SRD t− 1 -0.302∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗
[0.063] [0.071] [0.088] [0.091] [0.098] [0.102]
SRD t− 2 -0.160∗∗ -0.130∗ -0.043 -0.132 -0.230∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗
[0.065] [0.075] [0.081] [0.083] [0.091] [0.095]
Female -0.343∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗
[0.048] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] [0.049]
Age in Complete Years 0.242∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
Child of Household Head 0.052 0.047 0.103 0.080 0.051
[0.068] [0.069] [0.069] [0.068] [0.071]
Number of Siblings in h.h. 0.085∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
[0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023]
Number of Adults in h.h. -0.118∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024]
Number of Infants in h.h. 0.009 0.007 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
Sick in past 30 days -0.352∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗
[0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.063] [0.063]
Subsistence Farmer 0.394∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
[0.066] [0.066] [0.067] [0.068] [0.071]
ln(Owned Land in Km) 0.002 0.060∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗
[0.009] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021]
ln(Household Assets) -0.039∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.041∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.022
[0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026]
Observations 17937 15092 15092 15092 15091 14931
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No Region District Sub-county
1 This table presents the results from estimating the equation 6 via logistic regression, where the dependent
variable is child labor, taking value 1 if the child worked the week preceding the interview and zero otherwise.
Standardized Rainfall Deviation (SRD) is defined as
(Rst1−Rs)
σs
, where Rs is the average total yearly rainfall
for the period 1983-2015, Rst1 is the measure of total yearly rainfall at time t − 1, and σs is the standard
deviation of total yearly rainfall for the period. Female, Child of Household Head and Subsistence Farmer
are binary variables. They denote being a female child, being the biological child of the h.h. head, and
living in a subsistence-farming h.h., respectively. The estimates are weighted using UNPS sampling weights.
Robust standard error in squared brackets, clustered at household-by-wave level. ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗
5% significance level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
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Interpreting the findings through our theoretical framework, the results provide evidence that
the income effect, following an unanticipated and positive income shock, compensates for the
substitution effect stemming from the change in the opportunity cost of schooling. Concurrently,
however, we see that the effects on school attendance and child labor are weakened once we control
for lower units of aggregation, suggesting possible heterogeneous effects. In the next sub-section,
we explore this heterogeneity for households that rely on subsistence farming as their main source
of income.
3.5.1.2 Subsistence Farming Households
In this section we test for heterogeneous effects by interacting SRD with a binary variable recording
whether a household’s main source of income is subsistence farming.
Table 3.7: Regression Results, School Attendance - Interaction with Subsistence Farming
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SRD t− 1 0.503∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
[0.093] [0.104] [0.107] [0.106] [0.115] [0.129]
SRD t− 1 × Sub. Farmer -0.455∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗ -0.373∗∗
[0.153] [0.157] [0.160] [0.156] [0.146] [0.149]
SRD t− 2 0.630∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.203 0.290∗∗
[0.129] [0.132] [0.131] [0.131] [0.135] [0.145]
SRD t− 2 × Sub. Farmer -0.252 -0.226 -0.171 -0.110 0.128 0.122
[0.169] [0.172] [0.171] [0.168] [0.154] [0.160]
Subsistence Farmer 0.707∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.271 0.414∗∗
[0.199] [0.200] [0.200] [0.197] [0.194] [0.203]
Observations 15519 13839 13839 13839 13838 13030
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No Region District Sub-county
1 This table presents the results from estimating equation 6 via logistic regression, where the dependent variable is
school attendance, taking value 1 if the child attended school the week preceding the interview and zero otherwise.
Standardized Rainfall Deviation (SRD) is defined as
(Rst1−Rs)
σs
, where Rs is the average total yearly rainfall for the
period 1983-2015, Rst1 is the measure of total yearly rainfall at time t − 1, and σs is the standard deviation of
total yearly rainfall for the period. Female, Child of Household Head and Subsistence Farmer are binary variables.
They denote being a female child, being the biological child of the h.h. head, and living in a subsistence-farming
h.h., respectively. SRD × Subsistence Farmer is an interaction term between Standardized Rainfall Deviation and
the Subsistence-Farming h.h. binary variable. The estimates are weighted using UNPS sampling weights. Robust
standard error in squared brackets, clustered at household-by-wave level. ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance
level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
Table 3.7 displays the results for school attendance. We find that the effect of income shocks
is almost null for subsistence farmers. We also find a positive effect for households that do not
rely on subsistence farming as their main source of income. This pattern remains unchanged
as we add controls, although the magnitude of the coefficients decreases as we control for fixed
effects. Nonetheless, linear and interacted rainfall coefficients are statistically significant across
all columns. Taking our preferred estimate (column 6), we find that a unitary increase in SRD
increases the odds of a child attending school by 47% for non-subsistence farming household, but
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only by 5%, on average, for children from subsistence-farming households.
Table 3.8: Regression Results, Child Labor - Interaction with Subsistence Farming
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SRD t− 1 -0.248∗∗ -0.172 -0.142 -0.073 -0.136 -0.159
[0.106] [0.108] [0.118] [0.119] [0.125] [0.127]
SRD t− 1 × Sub. Farmer -0.084 -0.243∗ -0.244∗ -0.252∗ -0.246∗ -0.160
[0.133] [0.139] [0.141] [0.141] [0.140] [0.138]
SRD t− 2 -0.368∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗
[0.097] [0.114] [0.118] [0.123] [0.129] [0.135]
SRD t− 2 × Sub. Farmer 0.425∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
[0.126] [0.141] [0.142] [0.145] [0.148] [0.150]
Subsistence Farmer 0.314∗∗ 0.305∗ 0.297∗ 0.266 0.244 0.069
[0.156] [0.174] [0.176] [0.178] [0.182] [0.186]
Observations 17021 15092 15092 15092 15091 14931
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No Region District Sub-county
1 This table presents the results from estimating the equation 6 via logistic regression, where the dependent variable
is child labor, taking value 1 if the child worked the week preceding the interview and zero otherwise. Standardized
Rainfall Deviation is defined as
(Rst1−Rs)
σs
, where Rs is the average total yearly rainfall for the period 1983-2016,
Rst1 is the measure of total yearly rainfall at time t− 1, and σs is the standard deviation of total yearly rainfall for
the period 1983-2015. Female, Child of Household Head and Subsistence Farmer are binary variables. They denote
being a female child, being the biological child of the h.h. head, and living in a subsistence-farming h.h., respectively.
SRD × Subsistence Farmer is an interaction term between Standardized Rainfall Deviation and the Subsistence-
Farming h.h. binary variable. The estimates are weighted using UNPS sampling weights. Robust standard error
in squared brackets, clustered at household-by-wave level. ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ 1%
significance level.
Table 3.8 shows the interacted results for child labor. We do not find any significant results
when lagging SRD by one year. However, when using two lags, we find that a unitary increase
in SRD decreases the odds of child labor for non-subsistence farmers while having a quasi-null
or even negative effect in the case of children from subsistence farming households. This pattern
is statistically significant in all columns and varies only slightly in magnitude when adding fixed
effects. According to column 6, a unitary increase in SRD decreases the odds of child labor, on
average, by 3-5% (about 5 times less than for non-subsistence farming households).
School attendance and labor appear to be less sensitive to income shocks for children living
in subsistence farming house. Interpreting these findings through our theoretical framework, they
suggest that the income effect following an income shock does not compensate for the related
substitution effect in the case of children from subsistence farming households. Nevertheless, the
literature stresses the importance of skill acquisition, as opposed to mere schooling, in determining
economic development (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008). In the next sub-section we test if the
changes in educational inputs correlate to actual changes in math competency.
71
3.5.2 Tests scores
In this section we discuss the results we obtain when looking at learning outcomes as defined by
Uwezo competency levels in mathematics.
Table 3.9: Regression Results, Mathematics Competency Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SRD t− 1 -0.080∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.003 0.029 0.019
[0.012] [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.018]
SRD t− 2 0.094∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.032∗∗
[0.011] [0.013] [0.015] [0.015] [0.017] [0.016]
Female -0.010 -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 -0.015
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Age in Complete Years 0.130∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Grade 0.735∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Number of siblings -0.030∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.005
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Mother’s education 0.381∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Observations 350 507 321 650 321 650 321 650 321 650 321 650
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Fixed Effects No No No Region District Sub-county
1 This table presents the results from estimating the equation 6 via ordered logistic regression. The dependent
variable is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 (innumeracy) to 7 (being able to do grade-2-level divisions), denoting




Rs is the average total yearly rainfall for the period 1983-2016, Rst−1 is the measure of total yearly rainfall in
t − 1, and σs is the standard deviation of total yearly rainfall for the period 1983-2016. Mother’s Education is a
categorical variable ranging from 0 (no formal education) to 3 (> secondary education). The estimates are weighted
using Uwezo sampling weights. Robust standard error in squared brackets, clustered at household level. ∗ 10%
significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
Our results are displayed in Table 3.9. Column 1 shows the unconditional effects of rainfall
deviation, column 2 includes controls, column 3 adds year fixed effects, and columns 4 to 6 add
regional, district and sub-county fixed effects, respectively. Rainfall deviation at t−1 has a negative
and significant effect in columns 1 and 2, but switches sign in column 3 before becoming non-
statistically different from zero in columns 4 to 6. On the contrary, coefficients for rain deviation
at t− 2 are positive and statistically significant in all columns. Our preferred estimate (column 6)
shows that a unitary increase in SRD increases the odds of a child reaching a higher competency
level in mathematics by 3%.
To test the robustness of our results, we examine their sensitivity to several specification tests.
First, instead of using SRD, we use the standardized precipitation index (SPI). Second, for the sub-
counties for which we were not able to match rainfall data, we assign the district specific average.
Third, we test for non-linear effects of rain. Finally, we test for selection on unobservables (Oster
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selection). The results are presented in the appendix.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we address the relationship between income shocks and child educational develop-
ment, using rainfall deviation from the long-term average. We find that income shocks have a
positive impact on school attendance, school expenditures and competency in mathematics, and
a negative impact on child labor. We also find that the impact of income shocks is heteroge-
neous across household types in the case of school attendance and child labor. Specifically, income
shocks have almost no effect on these outcomes for children from subsistence-farming households.
We interpret these results through a theoretical framework which shows that a positive income
shock, increases both household revenue and the opportunity cost of schooling. As such, while
it makes schooling more affordable, it also reduces parents’ incentives to send their children to
school, making them more likely to send them to work.
Our findings have important policy implications. Times of better economic opportunities may
create incentives for households to send their children to work, especially for households where
child labor is critical to reach a subsistence level of consumption. In such instances, there is a
need for government to provide incentives to keep children in school. Although we cannot directly
link child schooling with educational outcomes, we believe the conflicting incentives following a
positive income shocks may lead to heterogeneous effects in learning proficiency as well. Further
research is needed to investigate whether income shocks translate differently into cognitive-skill
acquisition for children from different types of households.
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A Sample selection
UNPS 2010 includes 2991 households and 18 750 individuals. In UNPS 2011, 2721 households
and 19 194 individuals were sampled. Finally, UNPS 2012 covers 2907 households and 21 544
individuals. Out of these individuals, we select only children aged 6 to 16 years-old, so as to be
consistent with Uwezo’s age range. Furthermore, although we matched the majority of UNPS
households with the corresponding rain data for their sub-county of residence, successive changes
in administrative divisions in Uganda made it difficult to match rainfall data to some UNPS
sub-counties, resulting in the loss of about 10% of children’s observations.
Uwezo 2010 includes 12 380 households and 32 768 children. In the next wave – Uwezo 2011,
the sample grew considerably to reach 35 359 households and 100 715 children. In 2012, Uwezo
sampled 34 667 households and 92 188 children, and another 34 013 households and 87 339 children
in 2013. In 2014, Uwezo’s raw sample shrunk back to a level similar to 2010, with 11 670 sampled
households and 28 147 children. Finally, in 2015, 51 835 households and 164 129 were sampled by
Uwezo. In total, we matched 96% of all observations in our sample.
B Robustness
B.1 Mechanism
To check for the existence of other rain-sensitive factors which are related to educational devel-
opment, we reviewed recent economic research that looks at the impact of rainfall shocks. We
found the following channels, other than income, through which rainfall could affect our measures
of child educational development: health of children, fertility, food prices, land ownership, access
to credit, migration, civil conflict, floods and droughts.
The UNPS data allow us to test for health, fertility, migration, and land ownership, which we
include in all our regressions. To test for civil conflicts, we use Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP) data from the University of Uppsala.
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To check for non-linearities in the effect of rain on educational outcomes, we interact SRD with
a binary variable equal to 1 if standardized rainfall deviation is greater than 2 (flooding). The
results are presented in Table 3.10. Our main results remain qualitatively similar.
Table 3.10: Regression Results, non-linearity
In School School Expenditures Child Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SRD 0.353∗∗∗ 0.183 0.495∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.216∗
[0.082] [0.157] [0.059] [0.038] [0.060] [0.111]
Excess RainxSRD 11.694∗ 1.653 0.506 1.965∗∗∗ -2.171 -6.623∗
[6.347] [8.958] [1.053] [0.688] [3.449] [3.831]
Excess Rain -23.577∗ -2.817 -0.880 -4.163∗∗∗ 4.750 13.202∗
[12.969] [18.281] [2.186] [1.419] [7.337] [8.016]
Observations 16241 11744 12392 10436 17937 12686
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Individual Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Geography Fixed Effects No No No Region District Sub-county
1 This table presents the results from estimating the equation 6. SRD refers to Standardized Rainfall Deviation,
which is defined as
(Rst1−Rs)
σs
, where Rs is the average total yearly rainfall for the period 1983-2016, Rst−1 is the
measure of total yearly rainfall in t − 1, and σs is the standard deviation of total yearly rainfall for the period
1983-2016. Exess rain is a binary variable equal to 1 if standardized rainfall deviation suggest flooding conditions.
The regression controls (omitted) include age of child, mother’s education, number of siblings, number of adults
in the household, a variable looking at the health of the child, sex of the child, the amount of land owned, and
household assets. The estimates are weighted using Uwezo sampling weights. Robust standard error in squared
brackets, clustered at household level. ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
Finally, we use a different measure of long-term rain deviation, called the standardized precip-
itation index (SPI). The results are presented in Tables 3.11 and 3.12.
Table 3.11: Regression Results, SPI
In School School Expenditures Child Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPI 0.613∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗
[0.092] [0.157] [0.062] [0.040] [0.067] [0.113]
Observations 16241 11727 12392 10427 17937 12664
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Individual Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Geography Fixed Effects No Sub-county No Sub-county No Sub-county
1 This table presents the results from estimating the equation 6 for various outcomes. SPI refers to Standardized
Precipitation Index. SPI refers refers to the year t− 1 for school and child labor and t− 2 for school expenditures.
The regression controls (omitted) include age of child, mother’s education, number of siblings, number of adults
in the household, a variable looking at the health of the child, sex of the child, the amount of land owned, and
household assets. The estimates are weighted using Uwezo sampling weights. Robust standard error in squared
brackets, clustered at household level. ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
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Table 3.12: Regression Results, interacted SPI
In School School Expenditures Child Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
spixsubfarm -0.364∗∗ -0.387 0.070 0.036 0.435∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗
[0.177] [0.254] [0.066] [0.072] [0.130] [0.185]
SPI 0.783∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.122∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.744∗∗∗
[0.135] [0.236] [0.052] [0.057] [0.098] [0.167]
Subsistence Farmer 0.322∗∗ 0.539∗∗ -0.025 0.023 0.227∗ -0.339∗
[0.160] [0.259] [0.069] [0.074] [0.124] [0.177]
Observations 15519 11727 12003 10427 17021 12664
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Individual Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Geography Fixed Effects No Sub-county No Sub-county No Sub-county
1 This table presents the results from estimating the equation 6 for various outcomes. SPI refers to Standardized
Precipitation Index. SPI refers refers to the year t− 1 for school and child labor and t− 2 for school expenditures.
spixsubfarm is an interaction term between SPI and the Subsistence-Farming h.h. binary variable. The regression
controls (omitted) include age of child, mother’s education, number of siblings, number of adults in the household,
a variable looking at the health of the child, sex of the child, the amount of land owned, and household assets.
The estimates are weighted using Uwezo sampling weights. Robust standard error in squared brackets, clustered
at household level. ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
B.2 Unobservable Selection
A plausible concern to the study is that the results on children’s educational development might be
driven by unobservables. We follow Oster (2017) to calculate the level of proportionality between
the unobservables and observables, thereby examining if unobservable omitted variables spuriously
drive our results. We do this procedure using the STATA routine called psacalc only for school
expenses, as its implementation is, at the time of this writing, only available for linear models.
The process allows to estimate the coefficient that would result if the researcher were able to
control for unobservables (direct bias calculation) as well as calculating how important the unob-
servables would have to be relative to the observables to eliminate the estimated effect (bounding
argument). The results of the exercise (presented in the following table), suggest that the un-
observed variables would have explain more than twice the controls to eliminate the effect. Ad-
ditionally the coefficient is relatively stable, suggesting that omitted variables are not creating a
spurious relation.
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1 ∗ 10% significance level, ∗∗ 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ 1% significance level.
C Concave Production Function
The purpose of this section is to show the effects of the model presented in the text, using a
concave production function for child labor. Let the production function for the household be
f(lc, lp) where lc and lp are the labor by the child and the parent, respectively. Assume that the







In this setup, the exogenous shock also comes from a change in α. The term αf ′(sc) captures
the opportunity cost of schooling. Note that for a given α, the marginal productivity of child
labor is higher at low levels of child labor than at higher levels of child labor. As a result, the
substitution effect of an increase in α will be higher for households with low levels of child labor.
As such, we see that using a concave production function may lead to heterogeneous effects of
income shocks.
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